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ARTICLES 
 
Righting Others’ Wrongs 
A CRITICAL LOOK AT CLAWBACKS IN MADOFF-
TYPE PONZI SCHEMES AND OTHER FRAUDS 
Amy J. Sepinwall† 
INTRODUCTION 
We typically expect wrongdoers to redress the victims of 
their transgressions.1 But do those who innocently benefit from 
wrongdoing owe restitution to the victims of the wrong? Irving 
Picard, the trustee who has been charged with recovering and 
distributing money to the victims of Bernie Madoff’s Ponzi 
scheme, obviously thinks so.2 Picard has filed over one 
  
 † Assistant Professor, Department of Legal Studies and Business Ethics, The 
Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania. B.A., McGill University, 1997; M.A., 
McGill University, 1999; J.D., Yale Law School, 2004; Ph.D., Philosophy, Georgetown 
University, 2010. For helpful comments and suggestions, I am grateful to Dan Cahoy, 
David Grey, Peter Henning, Waheed Hussain, David Luban, Richard Shell, Andy 
Siegel, Alan Strudler, and Bill Tyson, as well as audiences at Wharton and the 2011 
Law and Society Annual Meeting. This paper was selected for the 2012 Huber Hurst 
Research Seminar in Business Law, Legal Studies, and Ethics, and benefited greatly 
from feedback received there. Generous support was provided by the Dean’s Research 
Fund at Wharton as well as the Wharton Legal Studies Research Fund. Hilary 
Greenwald and Joyce Shin provided excellent research assistance. All errors that 
remain are my own. 
 1 See, e.g., 1 FRANCIS HILLIARD, THE LAW OF TORTS OR PRIVATE WRONGS 82 
(1859) (“The liability to make reparation for an injury rests upon an original moral 
duty, enjoined upon every person, so to conduct himself or exercise his own rights as 
not to injure another.” (citation omitted) (emphasis omitted)); John C.P. Goldberg, The 
Constitutional Status of Tort Law: Due Process and the Right to a Law for the Redress 
of Wrongs, 115 YALE L.J. 524, 541-44 (2005) (describing the goal of tort law as seeking 
redress for private harm). For a searching review of the ways in which federal agencies 
have acted to compel disgorgement from wrongdoers and, in some cases, have then 
sought to return ill-gotten gains to the wrongdoers’ victims, see generally Adam S. 
Zimmerman, Distributing Justice, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 500 (2011). 
 2 See infra notes 119-120 and accompanying text. The Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) defines a Ponzi scheme as “an investment fraud that 
involves the payment of purported returns to existing investors from funds contributed by 
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thousand clawback suits,3 seeking to recover any money 
“winning investors” realized in excess of their investment and 
to return this money to the Madoff “losers,”4–i.e., those who 
lost some or all of their principal when the Ponzi scheme went 
bust.5 Kenneth Feinberg, former Special Master for the 
September 11 Victims Compensation Fund,6 therefore quips 
that the Madoff clawback suits have Picard “taking from Peter 
to pay Paul.”7 Importantly, the “Peters” in these suits include 
entities or individuals who are believed to have been innocent of 
any wrongdoing–there is no allegation that they knew or 
should have known of the fraud.8 Thus, the Madoff case provides 
  
new investors.” SEC, Ponzi Schemes–Frequently Asked Questions, http://www.sec.gov/ 
answers/ponzi.htm (last visited Nov. 1, 2012).  
 3 Times Topics: Irving H. Picard, N.Y. TIMES, http://topics.nytimes.com/topics/ 
reference/timestopics/people/p/irving_h_picard/index.html (last updated June 25, 2012); 
see also Lisa Sandler & Bob Van Voris, Madoff Trustee Defends “Clawbacks” in U.S. 
District Court, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 23, 2011, 9:10 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/ 
2011-08-23/madoff-trustee-defends-1-6-million-clawback-suit-in-u-s-district-court.html. 
 4 I follow the bankruptcy trustee in referring to those who had withdrawn 
amounts equal to or greater than their principal investment as “winners,” and to those 
who had not yet recovered all–or perhaps even any–of their principal when the 
scheme collapsed as “losers.” Nonetheless, I note that this is a tendentious way of 
describing the two categories of investors, since it implies that there is something 
undeserved about the money the “winners” obtained. See Clarence L. Pozza, Jr., et al., 
A Review of Recent Investor Issues in the Madoff, Stanford and Forte Ponzi Scheme 
Cases, 10 J. BUS. & SEC. L. 113, 117 (2010) (“Ponzi scheme investors [. . . ] are often 
regrettably characterized as ‘winners’ and ‘losers.’ This dichotomy tends to prejudge 
the equitable collection of funds and distribution to Ponzi victims.”) (citation omitted). 
 5 See, e.g., David Ellis, Madoff Investors May Have To Cough up Profits, 
CNNMONEY (July 26, 2010, 10:52 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2010/07/26/news/ 
companies/madoff_investors/index.htm; Ashby Jones, Madoff “Winners” Beware: Irv 
Picard Hasn’t Gone Away, WSJ LAW BLOG (July 26, 2010, 9:14 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/ 
law/2010/07/26/madoff-winners-youre-forewarned-irv-picard-hasnt-gone-away/. 
 6 See, e.g., Margaret L. Shaw, Madoff Victim Compensation: Interview with Ken 
Feinberg, 16 DISP. RESOL. MAG., Winter 2010, at 11. Kenneth Feinberg has also overseen 
compensation funds for victims of the Virginia Tech shootings, the BP oil spill, and 
Holocaust reparations. See generally FEINBERG ROZEN, LLP, http://www.feinbergrozen.com/ 
(last visited Oct. 1, 2012). 
 7 See Shaw, supra note 6, at 11. 
 8 I rely here on a standard definition of fraud. See, e.g., BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY FREE ONLINE (2d ed.), http://thelawdictionary.org/fraud/ (last visited Sept. 
7, 2012) (“Fraud consists of some deceitful practice or willful device, resorted to with 
intent to deprive another of his right, or in some manner to do him an injury.”). While 
many of those who have been targeted for clawbacks are innocent of the fraud, see, e.g., 
Richard Sandomir, Actions of Madoff Victims’ Trustee Will Be Reviewed, N.Y. TIMES, 
July 28, 2011, at B15, Picard alleges that many others knew or should have known. 
Most prominent among those whom the trustee accuses of having known about, or else 
been willfully blind to, the scheme, are Fred Wilpon and Saul Katz, real estate moguls 
and part owners of the New York Mets, who had invested their company’s revenues 
with Madoff. See, e.g., Jeffrey Toobin, Madoff’s Curveball: Will Fred Wilpon Be Forced 
to Sell the Mets? NEW YORKER (May 30, 2011), http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/ 
2011/05/30/110530fa_fact_toobin?printable=true&currentPage=all; Bob Van Voris, 
Madoff Trustee May Do What Bernie Didn’t: Give Victims Profit, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 11, 
2011, 12:01 AM), http:// www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-02-11/madoff-trustee-may-do-
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an opportunity to explore the grounds and bounds of restitution 
as between the innocent beneficiaries and victims of a wrong. 
We shall see that the questions of whether, when, and 
why innocent winners in a financial fraud should be compelled 
to restitute the fraud’s losers is both underserved by existing 
doctrine9 and understudied by scholars.10 Perhaps nowhere is 
  
something-bernie-never-did-give-victims-real-profit.html. The company used its Madoff 
accounts as a kind of bank, depositing money until it was needed for payroll or other 
expenses, withdrawing the needed funds, and then beginning the cycle anew. Toobin, 
supra; see also Richard Sandomir, Trustee Says Mets Saw Madoff as House Money, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 21, 2012, at B11. Over the years, Wilpon’s company deposited roughly $700 
million, and withdrew roughly $1 billion (the $300 million in excess of the company’s 
deposits was taken to constitute profits on the investment). See, e.g., Holman W. 
Jenkins, Jr., Madoff and the Mets: How the “Extremely Wealthy” Allowed the Madoff Fraud 
to Endure, WALL ST. J. (BUSINESS WORLD) (Feb. 8, 2011, 9:12 PM), http://online.wsj.com/ 
article/SB10001424052748704364004576132201926195.html.  
  Picard filed a lawsuit against Wilpon and his partners, seeking to claw 
back the $1 billion in withdrawals the firm had made from its Madoff accounts over the 
years. See, e.g., Michael O’Keefe, Feds To Investigate Irving Picard’s “Clawback” Suits 
To See if Madoff Ponzi Scheme Victims Are Hurt, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (July 28, 2011, 4:00 
AM), http://articles.nydailynews.com/2011-07-28/sports/29840581_1_madoff-trustee-
wilpon-and-katz-amanda-remus. The trustee maintains that the defendants did know, 
or should have known, about the Ponzi scheme, while the defendants vehemently 
contest these allegations, calling the claims against them “abusive, unfair[,] and 
untrue,” Bob Van Voris, Madoff Trustee May Do What Bernie Didn’t: Give Victims 
Profit, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 11, 2011, 12:01 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-
02-11/madoff-trustee-may-do-something-bernie-never-did-give-victims-real-profit.html. 
Madoff himself insists upon Wilpon and Katz’s innocence: “Fred was not at all stock 
market savvy and Saul was not really either. They were strictly Real Estate people. 
Although I explained the Strategy to them they were not sophisticated enough to 
evaluate it properly.” See Toobin, supra note 8, at 15 (internal quotation marks 
omitted). In a series of rulings, Judge Jed Rakoff reduced the maximum amount of 
recovery from the defendants to $384 million. See, e.g., Adam Rubin, Mets Owners Must 
Pay, Go to Trial, ESPNNEWYORK.COM (Mar. 6, 2012), http://espn.go.com/new-
york/mlb/story/_/id/7647107/judge-new-york-mets-owners-pay-much-83m-trial-decide-
303m. On March 16, 2012, Wilpon and partners entered into a settlement agreement 
with Picard under which they agreed to pay $162 million to the trustee. See, e.g., 
Richard Sandomir & Ken Belson, Mets’ Owners Agree to Settle Madoff Suit for $162 
Million, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 19, 2012, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/ 
03/20/sports/baseball/mets-owners-pay-162-million-to-settle-madoff-
suit.html?_r=1&pagewanted=print.  
 9 General restitutionary doctrine has long been charged with inattention 
and incoherence. See, e.g., Chaim Saiman, Restitution and the Production of Legal 
Doctrine, 65 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 993, 994 (2008) (“[I]n American legal discourse 
restitution sits at the backwaters of the academic and judicial consciousness . . . .”); 
Andrew Kull, Restitution in Bankruptcy: Reclamation and Constructive Trust, 72 AM. 
BANKR. L.J. 265, 267 (1998) (“Most law schools gave up teaching restitution a 
generation ago, and many judges and practitioners are not familiar with its general 
principles. Lack of familiarity with the restitutionary elements of the background rules 
results in a predictable distortion of commercial law.”). Cf. PETER BIRKS, UNJUST 
ENRICHMENT 40 (2005) (noting that novel fact patterns pose problems for the doctrine 
of unjust enrichment, since there isn’t a general, one-size-fits-all principle for 
determining when one party has innocently benefitted at the expense of another). See 
generally Mallory A. Sullivan, Note, When the Bezzle Bursts: Restitutionary 
Distribution of Assets After Ponzi Schemes Enter Bankruptcy, 68 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 
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this inattention more apparent, and potentially disquieting, 
than in the efforts to require innocent Ponzi scheme winners to 
defray the losses of the scheme’s losers. As courts have noted, 
the provisions governing the efforts to recover money for 
investors in a Ponzi scheme stand “at the intersection of two 
important national legislative policies on a collision course–
the policies of bankruptcy and securities law.”11 Neither of these 
bodies of law was designed with the other in mind,12 and there 
is much that remains unsettled in determining the appropriate 
interaction between the two.13 
  
1589, 1598-99 (2011) (describing the general confusion around restitution, especially in 
the context of a bankruptcy). 
 10 Cf. BIRKS, supra note 9, at 3 (“Of the subjects which form the indispensable 
foundation of private law, unjust enrichment is the only one to have evaded the great 
rationalization achieved by the writers of the textbooks since the middle of the 19th 
Century in England and America.”). 
 11 Picard v. Katz, 462 B.R. 447, 451 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (quoting In re Enron 
Creditors Recovery Corp., 651 F.3d 329, 334 (2d Cir. June 28, 2011) (citation omitted)); 
see also Katz, 462 B.R. at 450 (noting that the clawback lawsuit against Wilpon and his 
partners “raises important and in some respects unsettled issues of the interaction of 
securities law with bankruptcy law”). Cf. Hanoch Dagan, Restitution in Bankruptcy: 
Why All Involuntary Creditors Should Be Preferred, 78 AM. BANKR. L.J. 247, 247-48 
(2004) (discussing the untoward interaction of restitution and bankruptcy law). 
 12 See, e.g., Clarence L. Pozza, Jr., et al., A Review of Recent Investor Issues in 
the Madoff, Stanford and Forte Ponzi Scheme Cases, 10 J. BUS. & SEC. L. 113, 131 
(2010) (“The legal principles often utilized in the Ponzi scheme cases were not 
originally developed to address Ponzi scheme victim fairness issues and create 
somewhat extreme arguments and results.”). Cf. Kull, supra note 9, at 265-66 (“The 
contemporary treatment of restitution in bankruptcy has become confused and 
haphazard because the subject is not addressed by the Bankruptcy Code.”); Peter J. 
Henning, The Roller Coaster Ride Continues for Madoff Investors, N.Y. TIMES 
(DEALBOOK) (Oct. 3, 2011, 3:26 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/10/03/the-roller-
coaster-ride-for-madoff-investors-continues/ (“Investors in Mr. Madoff’s Ponzi scheme 
have been whipped back and forth as the courts try to apply the law to a case that is 
unprecedented in many ways.”). 
 13 See, e.g., Kathy Bazoian Phelps, Partner, Danning, Gill, Diamond & Kollitz 
L.L.P., Fraudulent Transfer Claims and Defenses in Ponzi Schemes, Address Before the 
Southwest Bankruptcy Conference (2009), available at http://www.abiworld.org/committees/ 
newsletters/litigation/vol6num5/ponzi.pdf (last visited on Sept. 24, 2012) (“[C]ourts are 
continuing to refine the rules which arise in unwinding these tangled financial webs. In 
particular, the law regarding fraudulent transfer claims to recover funds paid by the 
Ponzi debtor to investors as a return of principal or payment of fictitious profits and 
defenses which can be asserted to those claims continue to evolve.”); Joshua Marcus & 
Jake Greenberg, Ponzi Schemes: Washed Ashore by Recession’s Low Tide, Reveal 
Controversial Issues, 29 AM. BANKR. INST. J., Oct. 2010, at 48, 107 (“Ponzi schemes–
one of the horrible byproducts unearthed by the financial crisis–have raised 
noteworthy and contentious bankruptcy issues.”). Cf. Paul Sinclair, The Sad Tale of 
Fraudulent Transfers: The Unscrupulous Are Rewarded and the Diligent Are Punished, 
28 AM. BANKR. INST. J., Apr. 2009, at 16, 80 (“[P]ursuing investors who lacked diligence 
in Madoff will unnecessarily cost hundreds of millions.”); Jeff Benjamin, Madoff Investors 
May Face Clawbacks, INVESTMENT NEWS (Feb. 10, 2009), http://www.investmentnews.com/ 
article20090210/REG/902109979 (quoting an attorney involved in the Madoff clawback 
cases, who predicts that, given the unsettled questions of law, “[t]he [civil litigation] 
will spawn a whole industry for the next decade.”). 
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Even more concerning, few commentators have given 
thought to whether the recovery provisions of bankruptcy law 
ought to extend to the innocent beneficiaries of a financial 
fraud. This is especially troubling because no legal mechanism 
exists to permit recovery from investors who innocently profited 
from a financial fraud where the fraud does not result in the 
entity’s bankruptcy. In this way, Ponzi scheme winners incur 
harsher treatment than those who innocently profit from other 
kinds of financial fraud, although case law and commentaries do 
not offer a justification for this inconsistent treatment. In 
particular, outside of the doctrine of unjust enrichment–which, I 
argue, is inapposite here–we lack a theory that elucidates why, 
and if so when, innocent beneficiaries of a transgression owe 
restitution to the transgression’s victims. A central task of this 
Article is to provide such a theory, which can usefully be applied 
not just to Ponzi scheme cases but to other cases of financial 
wrongdoing as well–a prospect made all the more pressing in the 
wake of the financial meltdown.  
More specifically, I examine attempts to extend the 
recovery provisions of bankruptcy law to the innocent 
beneficiaries of a Ponzi scheme and, after an analysis of the 
history and structure of the relevant statutes, I argue that 
these attempts problematically deviate from the recovery 
provisions’ purpose. I then seek to establish that innocent 
winners in a Ponzi scheme are unlike the innocent beneficiaries 
of ill-gotten gains or good faith purchasers of stolen goods, and 
instead are more akin to investors who innocently profit from 
corporate or financial wrongdoing. Yet, so long as the offending 
corporations or brokerage firms do not end up bankrupt, the 
innocent investors who earned profits as a result of the wrongful 
conduct will be permitted to retain their “winnings.” I contend 
that if we do not seek to claw back profits from these innocent 
investors, then we should not seek to claw back profits from the 
  
  It may be worth noting that there is a prior question as to whether 
bankruptcy law should apply at all in the wake of a Ponzi scheme, given that criminal 
forfeiture exists as a viable alternative. Supporters of criminal forfeiture argue that it 
would be less costly, thereby leaving more money to be distributed to the fraud’s 
victims, and more compelling, given its retributive rationale. See generally Marcus & 
Greenberg, supra. Bankruptcy looks nonetheless to remain a preferred avenue for 
restituting the victims of a financial fraud, not least of all because it allows the estate 
to recover assets beyond those of the fraud’s perpetrator–of particular relevance here, 
those of innocent winning investors. Cf. Paul W. Bonapfel et al., Bankruptcy Court v. 
Federal Equity Receivership, 26 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 207, 212-13 (2010). 
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innocent Ponzi scheme winners, either.14 That contention, of 
course, could cut in two diametrically opposed directions–one 
could argue that we should allow the losses to lie where they 
fell or, by contrast, that we should implement restitution on a 
far wider scale than the law currently allows. I end by seeking 
to defend the latter alternative and by suggesting measures 
through which it could be implemented. 
It is surprising that scholars have largely overlooked 
clawback suits in the context of a Ponzi scheme, given the 
troubling uncertainty and evident tensions they involve,15 as well 
as the dramatic rise in their use. While the first set of clawback 
cases eventuating from a Ponzi scheme arose in the wake of 
Charles Ponzi’s now infamous fraud16 during the 1920s,17 it was 
only in the 1980s that the use of a clawback suit to recover 
money from an innocent investor became widespread; in fact, 
149 of the 190 published state and federal cases were decided in 
or after the year 2000.18 Further, commentators predict that 
these suits will become even more common in the coming years.19 
  
 14 The migration of the noun “clawback” to the verb form “claw back,” appears 
to have gained currency in the 1980s, in light of efforts to enforce anti-trust provisions 
extraterritorially, and a resulting response permitting the defendant to recoup–i.e., claw 
back–damages imposed on him. See, e.g., Note, Extraterritorial Application of the Export 
Administration Act of 1979 Under International and American Law, 81 MICH. L. REV. 
1308, 1318 n.58 (1983) (“[A] number of foreign states have enacted ‘blocking’ or ‘claw-
back’ statutes designed to protect their citizens from assertions of extraterritorial 
jurisdiction by the United States.”); Note, Predictability and Comity: Toward Common 
Principles of Extraterritorial Jurisdiction, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1310, 1311 n.6 (1985) 
(“Clawback statutes, such as § 6 of the British Protection of Trading Interests Act, 1980, 
ch. 11, follow from the premise that certain foreign judgments will not be given 
extraterritorial effect. . . . Once such a statute is invoked, the foreign defendant will be 
allowed to ‘claw back’ the punitive portion of the judgment (for example, two-thirds of a 
treble-damages antitrust award).” (citations omitted)).  
 15 Cf. Miriam A. Cherry & Jarrod Wong, Clawbacks: Prospective Contract 
Measures in an Era of Excessive Executive Compensation and Ponzi Schemes, 94 MINN. L. 
REV. 368, 411 (2009) (noting that the term clawback “has been subject to neither rigorous 
analytical scrutiny nor definition and exposition”); Robert A. Prentice & Dain C. 
Donelson, Insider Trading as a Signaling Device, 47 AM. BUS. L.J. 1, 15 (2010) (observing 
that clawback provisions were “essentially unknown” before Sarbanes-Oxley). 
 16 Cunningham v. Brown, 265 U.S. 1, 7-9 (1924) (discussing the collapse of 
Charles Ponzi’s fraudulent investment program). 
 17 Ponzi’s scheme gave rise to eleven published opinions, two in state courts 
and the remainder in federal court, including two that went to the Supreme Court: 
Ponzi v. Fessenden, 258 U.S. 254 (1922), and Cunningham, supra note 16. 
 18 See infra notes 86 and 87 and accompanying text (describing the evolution 
of the law on this score). 
 19 See, e.g., Michael C. Macchiarola, In the Shadow of the Omnipresent Claw: A 
Response to Professors Cherry and Wong, MINN. L. REV. HEADNOTES (2011), 
http://www.minnesotalawreview.org/headnotes/in-the-shadow-of-the-omnipresent-claw-in-
response-to-professors-cherry-wong-2/#_ftn9 (“As the American economy continues to totter 
against an ever-growing populist momentum, it seems likely that clawback mechanisms of 
various sorts will be put to increasing use in the coming months and years.”). 
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To be sure, the Madoff scandal itself has garnered 
significant media and scholarly attention. Much of this has 
focused on the factors that facilitated the scheme–Madoff’s 
exploitation of the affinity bonds he shared with many of his 
victims,20 his proclaimed split-strike strategy,21 and the SEC’s 
failure to detect the fraud.22 Other work has either addressed 
alternative enforcement regimes in the case of a Madoff-type 
fraud23 or revisited white-collar crime sentencing policies24 in light 
of Madoff’s 150-year prison sentence,25 which is likely to be the 
longest sentence ever imposed for a violation of an antifraud law.26 
The handful of scholars who have addressed the use of 
clawback suits against innocent investors in Ponzi scheme 
cases have largely agreed that the suits are permissible in 
principle, and possibly even worthwhile.27 Existing critical 
commentary tends to take issue only with the ways the suits 
are wielded in practice. Thus, scholars have objected to judicial 
interpretations of the doctrine;28 the ad hoc development of the 
law, which threatens uniformity and predictability;29 the 
opportunity for abuse of discretion that the suits allegedly 
  
 20 See, e.g., Christine Hurt, Evil Has a New Name (and a New Narrative): 
Bernard Madoff, 2009 MICH. ST. L. REV. 947, 957 (2009); Paul Krugman, Madoff Explains 
Everything, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 17, 2011, 4:24 PM), http://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/ 
2011/11/17/madoff-explains-everything (“The Madoff affair, as you may know, was a 
classic case of ‘affinity fraud.’”). 
 21 See, e.g., Carole Bernard & Phelim Boyle, Mr. Madoff’s Amazing Returns: 
An Analysis of the Split-Strike Conversion Strategy, 17 J. DERIVATIVES 62, 62 (2009). 
 22 See, e.g., Donald Langevoort, The SEC and the Madoff Scandal: Three 
Narratives in Search of a Story, 2009 MICH. ST. L. REV. 899, 900 (2009). 
 23 See, e.g., Amanda M. Rose, The Multienforcer Approach to Securities Fraud 
Deterrence: A Critical Analysis, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 2173, 2176 (2010); Jennifer J. 
Johnson, Secondary Liability for Securities Fraud: Gatekeepers in State Court, 36 DEL. 
J. CORP. L. 463, 467 (2011). 
 24 See, e.g., Daniel V. Dooley, Sr. & Mark Radke, Does Severe Punishment 
Deter Financial Crimes?, 4 CHARLESTON L. REV. 619, 622 (2010); Derick R. Vollrath, 
Note, Losing the Loss Calculation: Toward A More Just Sentencing Regime in White-
Collar Criminal Cases, 59 DUKE L.J. 1001, 1004 (2010). 
 25 Transcript of Sentencing Hearing at 49, United States v. Madoff, 626 F. 
Supp. 2d. 420 (S.D.N.Y. June 17, 2009) (No. 09 Crim. 213 (DC)). 
 26 Peter J. Henning, The Limits of Bigger Penalties in Fighting Financial 
Crime, N.Y. TIMES (DEALBOOK) (Dec. 12, 2011, 4:03 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/ 
2011/12/12/the-limits-of-bigger-penalties-in-fighting-financial-crime. 
 27 See, e.g., Cherry & Wong, supra note 15, at 397. 
 28 The most common line of criticism on this score takes issue with what is 
taken to be an overly demanding standard of good faith, and an overly draconian set of 
consequences if one is shown to have lacked good faith, including compelled return of 
any money one withdrew from the scheme, whether as “profits” or principal. See, e.g., 
Sullivan, supra note 9, at 1615-23. 
 29 See, e.g., Pozza et al., supra note 12, at 131 (“The current case-by-case 
approach does not appear to yield fair uniform results. A new comprehensive approach 
designed for overall victim fairness should be considered.”); Sullivan, supra note 9, at 
1632; Macchiarola, supra note 19, Conclusion (text accompanying notes 67-68).  
8 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 78:1 
afford;30 or the negative consequences that the suits are 
believed to produce among investors.31 But there has been no 
sustained inquiry into the foundational normative question–
namely, whether innocent winning investors should be required 
to help defray losing investors’ losses in the first place.32 This 
Article addresses that question and concludes that clawback 
suits targeting blameless winners lack a compelling legal or 
equitable basis.  
The Article first proceeds, in Part I, by offering some of 
the factual and legal background to the Madoff case. In Part II, 
I turn to the legislative history and statutory structure of the 
Bankruptcy Code’s recovery provisions, and I argue that there 
is only a weak doctrinal basis for the bankruptcy trustee’s 
clawback efforts. Nonetheless, analogies to widely embraced 
rules surrounding unjust enrichment and stolen goods provide 
considerable intuitive support for the notion that Ponzi scheme 
winners should return some of their gains to the scheme’s 
losers. For example, where an individual gains as a result of a 
wrong perpetrated against another–at that victim’s expense–
  
 30 Of particular note here is a concern that the trustee can use the threat of 
protracted, costly litigation to leverage settlements from investors who may have been 
wholly innocent of the fraud. See, e.g., Sullivan, supra note 9, at 1629-30. Cf. Voris, supra 
note 8 (quoting Wilpon and Katz’s complaint that the lawsuit against them is nothing 
more than “an outrageous strong-arm effort to try to force a settlement by threatening to 
ruin our reputations and businesses” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 31 Thus, for example, Karen Nelson argues that the clawback suits create in-
fighting between the scheme’s investors, and encourage attorneys, in contravention of 
legal ethics, to advise their Madoff-investing clients to secret away their assets. See 
Karen E. Nelson, Note, Turning Winners into Losers: Ponzi Scheme Avoidance Law and 
the Inequity of Clawbacks, 95 MINN. L. REV. 1456, 1473, 1457-58 (2011). Nelson also 
argues that clawing back money from innocent investors “strays from America’s 
fundamental tenets of capitalism.” Id. at 1458. I set this last concern aside because our 
political and economic culture is replete with instances in which individuals or entities 
help to defray losses that they have neither culpably caused, nor caused at all. Take, 
for example, the September 11th compensation fund, or our progressive system of 
taxation, for that matter. I go on to argue for a compensation program more expansive 
than the one entailed by the clawback suits, on the thought that there is usually 
nothing but luck that distinguishes those who profit from the stock market from those 
who do not. Luck should not play so great a role in determining whether one ends up 
on the losing end of a wrong. If capitalism cannot accommodate that thought, so much 
the worse for capitalism.  
  Mallory Sullivan complains that the clawback suits are unfair because 
they target investors who may have relied reasonably on the legitimacy of their 
withdrawals, and so no longer have the money now sought to be clawed back. See 
Sullivan, supra note 9, at 1633-34. Reasonable reliance seems to be the rationale 
underlying legislative proposals to limit, if not eliminate, clawback suits against 
innocent Ponzi scheme investors. See Sullivan, supra note 9, at 1633-34.  
 32 But cf. O’Keefe, supra note 8 (describing a pending GAO investigation into 
Picard’s recovery efforts, including his clawback suits, in response to a letter from several 
Congresspersons expressing concern about the trustee’s “punishing the Ponzi scheme 
scammer’s victims by filing ‘clawback’ lawsuits”) (quoting Rep. Scott Garret (R-N.J.)). 
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the individual may be compelled to return these ill-gotten 
gains. Similarly, where an individual purchases an item 
without knowledge that it is stolen, she must return the stolen 
item to its original owner, even if that means the innocent 
purchaser will forfeit the money she paid to the seller. 
Pursuant to this reasoning, the Madoff bankruptcy trustee has 
sought to defend the clawback actions by analogizing them to 
cases seeking the disgorgement of ill-gotten gains or the return 
of stolen goods. In Part III, I argue that these analogies are 
mistaken, because the Madoff winners are neither the 
beneficiaries of a windfall–as is typically true in cases of unjust 
enrichment–nor the recipients of a unique, non-fungible good, 
as is typically true in cases of stolen goods. In Part IV, I examine 
other doctrines that appear to impose pecuniary penalties on 
investors who innocently profit from corporate or financial 
wrongdoing, but I argue that their apparent resemblance is 
deceiving. These doctrines either extend only to investors who 
are not wholly innocent of the wrongdoing or do not in fact 
require the innocent investor to return money as a means of 
offering restitution. Together, Parts II, III, and IV seek to 
establish that we cannot find support for the Ponzi scheme 
clawback actions in the bankruptcy code, or within other 
equitable or legal doctrines. Nevertheless, rather than 
abandoning the prospect of restitution altogether, I seek, in Part 
V, to defend a restitutionary scheme that would have all those 
who profit in the market defray the losses that fraudulent 
schemes produce. In other words, I argue that “winning” 
investors bear restitutionary obligations whether their profits 
derive from a legitimate or fraudulent investment vehicle. I 
thus end by urging a far more expansive restitutionary 
program than clawback suits currently afford.  
I. FACTUAL AND LEGAL BACKGROUND 
The Madoff scandal is a good place to begin an 
investigation into Ponzi scheme clawback cases–not only 
because it is the largest fraud in recorded history, but also 
because it provides an entrée to the legal framework governing 
clawback suits and the murky, ad hoc, and oftentimes flawed 
judicial reasoning that these suits invite. In Part I.A, I provide 
a brief overview of the relevant facts leading up to Madoff’s 
arrest and the commencement of the recovery actions. Part I.B 
engages critically with the Second Circuit opinion that set the 
stage for the clawback suits by denying the Madoff winners’ 
10 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 78:1 
claims to recover what they believed they were owed based on 
their last investment account statements.  
A. History and Revelation of a Fraud 
Madoff created Bernard L. Madoff Investment 
Securities (BLMIS) in the early 1960s,33 originally functioning 
as a market-maker and broker-dealer.34 Later, Madoff added an 
investment advisory arm to the business, which Madoff used to 
recruit investors for his eventual Ponzi scheme.35 Although 
Madoff, in the course of his confession, reported that the Ponzi 
scheme began in the early 1990s,36 one of his associates has 
since revealed that the scheme in fact dated back to the early 
1970s.37 It is not clear how much of Madoff’s business was 
fraudulent in the period between the 1970s and the 1990s. But 
we do know that beginning in the 1990s, Madoff did not buy or 
sell a single share on behalf of his customers, despite sending 
investors regular statements that reported market transactions 
and indicated an average growth of 12 percent.38 Madoff 
claimed that his consistent positive returns resulted from a 
unique split-strike conversion strategy that he had pioneered.39  
Because Madoff made no investments, customer 
redemptions were funded with money that other customers had 
deposited with him. Thus, when a customer sought to withdraw 
money from her account in an amount listed on her most recent 
statement, Madoff made up the difference between the amount 
the customer had invested and the amount she sought to 
withdraw with money other customers had “invested” with him.40 
  
 33 Complaint at 4, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Madoff, 2009 WL 980288 
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 10, 2009) (No. 08-CV-10791). 
 34 See, e.g., Martin P. Randisi & Joseph Koletar, A CAT Scan of the Madoff 
Scandal: Diagnosing Fraud Inside The Black Box, HOLTZ RUBENSTEIN REMINICK LLP, 
at 4, available at http://www.hrcpa.com/Catscan.pdf (last visited Sept. 24, 2012). 
 35 See, e.g., Plea Allocution of Bernard L. Madoff, at *2, *4, available at 
http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/20090315madoffall.pdf (last visited 
Sept. 24, 2012). 
 36 Id. at *2. 
 37 See Madoff Associate Says Fraud Went Back to ‘70s, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21, 
2011, at B4. 
 38 See Robert J. Rhee, The Madoff Scandal, Market Regulatory Failure and 
the Business Education of Lawyers, 35 J. CORP. L. 363, 371-72 (2009). Rhee here 
describes the difficulty that a typical investor would have faced in seeking to establish 
that these returns were impossible.  
 39 “The split-strike conversion strategy supposedly involved buying a basket 
of stocks listed on the Standard & Poor’s 100 Index and hedging through the use of 
options.” In re Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Sec. LLC, 654 F.3d 229, 231 (2d Cir. 2011). 
 40 See Plea Allocution of Bernard L. Madoff, supra note 35, at *1. 
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Importantly, many of those who withdrew more money 
from their Madoff accounts than their principal investments 
were genuinely in the dark about his fraud. For one thing, we 
now know that Madoff was masterful when it came to hiding his 
fraud. He maintained an aloof posture, often refusing a 
prospective investor before “accepting” her business;41 his returns 
were consistent but also relatively modest so as not to arouse 
suspicion;42 and the purported split-strike conversion strategy 
was a seemingly plausible vehicle for generating these steady, 
yet unspectacular returns.43 Further, a securities investor has no 
duty to inquire about his stockbroker, even if confronted with 
suspicious circumstances.44 In any event, Madoff’s investors may 
have had some cause for assurance. In particular, many of them 
knew that the SEC had investigated Madoff and had never 
uncovered any financial wrongdoing.45 They may even have 
reasonably relied on the fact that financial regulators believed 
Madoff’s business to be clean.46 Indeed, if the SEC proved 
  
 41 See, e.g., Robert Chew, A Madoff Whistle-Blower Tells His Story, TIME, Feb. 4, 
2009, available at http://www.time.com/time/business/article/0,8599,1877181,00.html 
(“Madoff’s greatest talent, the witness indicated, was his use of a ‘hook’ or lure to play 
‘hard to get’ and the false security of exclusivity, a hallmark of a Ponzi scheme.”); 
DAVID E.Y. SARNA, HISTORY OF GREED: FINANCIAL FRAUD FROM TULIP MANIA TO 
BERNIE MADOFF, ch. 21 (2010). 
 42 See, e.g., Sullivan, supra note 9, at 1622-23. 
 43 See Assessing the Madoff Ponzi Scheme and Regulatory Failures: Hearing 
Before the Subcomm. on Capital Mkts., Ins., and Gov’t Sponsored Enters. of the H. 
Comm. on Fin. Servs., 111th Cong. 31 (2009) (testimony of Harry Markopolos, 
Chartered Financial Analyst, Certified Fraud Examiner) [hereinafter Hearings], 
available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-111hhrg48673/pdf/CHRG-
111hhrg48673.pdf (last visited Nov. 5, 2012). See generally Richard Posner, Bernard 
Madoff and Ponzi Schemes–Posner’s Comment, BECKER-POSNER BLOG (Dec. 21, 2008, 
3:45 PM), http://www.becker-posner-blog.com/2008/12/bernard-madoff-and-ponzi-
schemes--posners-comment.html (“The strategy . . . attributed to Madoff is the opposite 
of that of the typical Ponzi schemer: it [wa]s to obtain investments from well-off people 
far more financially sophisticated than the average Ponzi victim, including genuine 
financial experts such as hedge fund managers and bank officials. And therefore it 
require[d] different tactics from that of the ordinary Ponzi scheme, such as offering 
returns only moderately above average, satisfying redemption requests promptly, 
turning down some would-be investors . . . , and trading on a reputation earned in a 
legitimate business (Madoff’s business of market making).”). 
 44 See, e.g., Picard v. Katz, 462 B.R. 447, 455 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (citing In re 
New Times Sec. Servs., 371 F.3d 68, 87 (2d Cir. 2004)). On the other hand, an investor 
will undercut his claim to have proceeded in good faith if he has willfully blinded 
himself to red flags. See id. at 455. 
 45 See, e.g., Zachary A. Goldfarb, SEC Lawyer Raised Madoff Concerns but 
was Rebuffed, L.A. TIMES, July 2, 2009, at B3, available at http://articles.latimes.com/ 
2009/jul/02/business/fi-sec-madoff2. 
 46 See, e.g., Herve Stolowy et al., Information, Trust and the Limits of 
“Intelligent Accountability” in Investment Decision Making: Insights from the Madoff Case 
15-17 (Sept. 17, 2011) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1930128 (collecting quotes from Madoff investors who stated 
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incapable of detecting the fraud, it is not reasonable to suppose 
that the average investor should have done so. Thus, we may 
assume that many investors in Madoff’s scheme were blamelessly 
ignorant of his wrongdoing.47 Many investors profited from the 
fraud, but they did so innocently; they did not know, and had no 
reason to know, that Madoff was operating a Ponzi scheme.48 
With markets crashing in the fall of 2008, an 
unexpected number of Madoff customers sought to liquidate 
their accounts. Because Madoff could not possibly satisfy all of 
the claims, the scheme went bust.49 After Madoff confessed to 
his family on December 10, 2008, his sons consulted with their 
lawyer and tipped the police off to the fraud. Madoff was 
arrested the next day.50 At the time, Madoff had 4800 
customers with open accounts, who had invested a total of $20 
billion in principal and accumulated an aggregate (fictitious) 
sum of $65 billion, according to their last statements on 
November 30, 2008.51 It was clear that Madoff did not have $20 
billion in assets to return to his customers, let alone the $65 
billion they thought they were owed.52 The company officially 
went into bankruptcy on the day of Madoff’s arrest.53 
  
that they were reassured that the investment scheme was legitimate as a result of the 
SEC’s failure to uncover any fraud).  
 47 See generally Felicia Smith, Madoff Ponzi Scheme Exposes “The Myth of the 
Sophisticated Investor,” 40 U. BALT. L. REV. 215, 273 & n.305 (2010) (citing arguments 
that regulations concerning who counts as a sophisticated investor are too broad as, for 
example, where a high net wealth is sufficient to qualify the investor as “sophisticated”).  
 48 Picard acknowledges this when he states, on the webpage summarizing his 
efforts, that “[s]ome BLMIS customers unwittingly withdrew funds that were, in 
reality, money stolen by Madoff from other BLMIS customers.” A Message from SIPA 
Trustee Irving H. Picard, MADOFF RECOVERY INITIATIVE, http://madoff.com/trustee-
message-24.html (last visited Mar. 6, 2012) (emphasis added). 
 49 See, e.g., David A. Gradwohl & Karin Corbett, Equity Receiverships for 
Ponzi Schemes, 34 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 181, 189 (2010) (“With Madoff, the engine of 
fraud churned on until the collapse of the securities markets caused new investors to 
stop feeding the scheme and made it impossible for Madoff to continue.”). 
 50 See, e.g., The Madoff Case: A Timeline, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 12, 2009), 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB112966954231272304.html?mod=googlenews_wsj; Diana 
B. Henriques, New Description of Timing on Madoff’s Confession, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9, 2009, 
at B1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/10/business/10madoff.html?_r=1; 
Ellen S. Podgor, Madoff, WHITE COLLAR CRIME PROF BLOG (Dec. 16, 2008), 
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/whitecollarcrime_blog/2008/12/the-madoff-case.html 
(listing a variety of media reports on the Madoff ponzi scheme).  
 51 See, e.g., Allison Hoffman, Prosecutors Submit Scam E-mail with Madoff 
Victim Letters, JERUSALEM POST, Mar. 24, 2009, available at http://www.jpost.com/ 
International/Article.aspx?id=136942. 
 52 See, e.g., Linda Sandler, Madoff Brokerage, Homes, Boats Valued at $1 
Billion (Update2), BLOOMBERG (Jan. 9, 2009, 11:43 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/ 
apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aZP0jyjuTdTI. 
 53 See Sec. Investor Prot. Corp. v. Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Sec. LLC (In re 
Bernard L. Madoff), 429 B.R. 423 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010), aff’d, 848 F. Supp. 2d 469 
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Pursuant to the Securities Investor Protection Act 
(SIPA), Irving Picard was appointed as a trustee to recover 
money and redistribute it to creditors of the estate.54 SIPA 
instructs the trustee “to distribute customer property 
and . . . otherwise satisfy net equity claims,”55 and “to liquidate 
the business of the debtor.”56 For the latter, the trustee must 
proceed in accordance with the bankruptcy code under Title 11.57  
In structuring his recovery efforts, the trustee has been 
required to address two broad questions: first, who is entitled to 
restitution, and second, who should provide restitution to those 
entitled to it? The clawback suits against innocent investors 
provide a partial response to the second question, and their 
justifiability is the major focus of this Article. Nonetheless, an 
examination of the trustee’s response to the first question is also 
useful, since it demonstrates the legal uncertainty in this area 
and sets the stage for the clawback suits.  
B. Defining “Net Equity” 
The Securities Investor Protection Act (SIPA) provides 
that, in the event that a broker-dealer fails and is unable to 
cover its obligations, the trustee shall “distribute customer 
property and otherwise satisfy net equity claims of customers.”58 
Among the first questions for Picard to resolve were who would 
count as a customer entitled to “customer property,” and what 
net equity were these customers due. In Madoff’s case, 
delineating the set of customers was rather complicated. While 
some of those who lost money as a result of Madoff’s fraud and 
wanted to press claims of relief had invested directly with 
Madoff, others had invested in Madoff “feeder funds.” Sixteen 
  
(S.D.N.Y. 2012); Sec. Investor Prot. Corp. v. Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Sec. LLC (In re 
Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Sec. LLC), 424 B.R. 122, 124 & n.3 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010), 
aff’d, 654 F.3d 229 (2d Cir. 2011).  
 54 See, e.g., A Message from SIPA Trustee, Irving H. Picard, MADOFF 
RECOVERY INITIATIVE, http://www.madoff.com/trustee-message-02.html (last visited 
Mar. 6, 2012). This is the trustee home page for the website the Madoff SIPA trustee 
has established to report on the progress of the case and provide interested parties 
with relevant information. On this page, Picard explains that “On the day the news [of 
Madoff’s fraud] broke, I received a call from the Securities Investor Protection 
Corporation (‘SIPC’) and was asked to serve as SIPA Trustee for the liquidation of 
Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities LLC (‘BLMIS’) under the Securities Investor 
Protection Act (‘SIPA’).”  
 55 Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970, 15 U.S.C. § 78fff(a)(1)(B) (2006). 
 56 Id. § 78fff(a)(4).  
 57 Id. § 78fff-4(e). 
 58 Id. § 78fff(a)(1)(B). 
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feeder funds brought suit, seeking to have their status as SIPA 
investors recognized. Judge Burton Lifland, the bankruptcy 
judge handling the Madoff SIPA liquidation, denied them relief 
and held that they do not count as “customers” under the SIPA 
statute.59 The feeder funds appealed, but Judge Lifland’s decision 
was affirmed by the District Court for the Southern District of 
New York in an opinion issued in January of this year.60 
When it came to determining the customers’ “net 
equity”–i.e., the money they were entitled to recover–there 
arose a “controversy of staggering proportions involving 
statutory interpretation, statutory purpose, the relationship of 
multiple SIPA and bankruptcy law provisions, and fundamental 
bankruptcy law philosophy.”61 Using the “Last Statement” 
method of calculating net equity, investors in Madoff’s scheme 
asserted claims in the amounts listed on the last statements 
they had received before the fund’s collapse.62 On the other hand, 
relying on the “Net Investment” or “Cash-In-Cash-Out” method, 
Picard, along with the SEC and SIPC, believed that the Madoff 
investors should be entitled only to the amounts they had 
deposited, minus any money withdrawn.63  
In a March 1, 2010 opinion, Judge Lifland adopted the 
“Net Investment” method: customers would be entitled to 
  
 59 See Sec. Investor Prot. Corp. v. Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Sec., 454 B.R. 285 
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2011), aff’d sub nom. Aozora Bank Ltd. v. Sec. Investor Prot. Corp., 
No. 1:11-CV-05683-DLC, 2012 BL 54585 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 4, 2012). 
 60 See generally Aozora Bank, 2012 BL 54585.  
 61 Paul Sinclair & Brendan McPherson, The Sad Tale of Multiple Overlapping 
Fraudulent Transfers: Part IV, 29 AM. BANKR. INST. J., May 2010, at 18.  
 62 See, e.g., In re Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Sec. LLC, 654 F.3d 229, 233 (2d Cir. 
2011); Peter J. Henning, The Next Test for the Madoff Trustee, N.Y. TIMES (DEALBOOK) 
(Mar. 2, 2011, 8:50 AM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/03/02/the-next-test-for-the-
madoff-trustee/. 
 63 See In re Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Sec., 654 F.3d at 233; Henning, supra 
note 62. It may be worth noting in this context that SIPC pays Picard’s salary for the 
Madoff litigation (though SIPC will recover the payments it makes to Picard through 
whatever funds he is able to recoup). See, e.g., Gretchen Morgenson, Many Holes 
Weaken Safety Net for Victims of Failed Brokerages, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25, 2000, at A1, 
A24. This arrangement can prompt the trustee in a SIPA proceeding, who likely wants 
to become or remain a repeat player in this game, to be chary with claims and 
aggressive with recovery efforts. Id. An uncharitable take on Picard would find 
evidence for this motivation in his narrow reading of “net equity.” Cf. Paul Sinclair & 
Brendan McPherson, Does SIPC Protect Customers in Ponzi Scheme Cases? Sad Tales 
of Multiple Overlapping Fraudulent Transfers IV, 7 AM. BANKR. INST.: COMMERCIAL FRAUD 
COMM. NEWS, Sept. 2010, at 267-68, available at http://www.abiworld.org/committees/ 
newsletters/CFTF/vol7num3/sipc.pdf (commenting on the “net equity” decision in the 
Madoff case, and contending that “[t]his SIPC controversy . . . is further infected by the 
SIPC’s position as an industry body, rather than a governmental agency charged to 
protect investors, and thus its alleged effort to simply reduce its losses to the most 
limited amounts”).  
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recover only their principal, minus any withdrawals they had 
made over the life of their investments.64 The Second Circuit 
affirmed this decision in an opinion issued on August 16, 
2011,65 adducing three grounds in support of its decision. 
Specifically, the court argued that allowing the net winners to 
recover any of the money they believed resided in their 
accounts would (1) place the trustee in the impossible position 
of having to invent recovery entitlements, given that Madoff’s 
records were completely fictitious and could not provide any 
basis for ascertaining how much “profit” any investor was due; 
(2) unjustly enrich the winners at the expense of the losers; and 
(3) problematically legitimate Madoff’s fraud by recognizing 
and upholding the fiction he had perpetrated. I address each of 
these in turn, and argue that none is convincing on its own or 
in combination with the others. 
1. Unascertainable Holdings 
The court’s first set of arguments relates to 
administrative convenience. The SIPA statute requires the 
trustee “to make payments to customers based on ‘net equity’ 
insofar as the amount owed to the customer is ‘ascertainable 
from the books and records of the debtor or [is] otherwise 
established to the satisfaction of the trustee.’”66 Because 
Madoff’s books and records were “after-the-fact constructs that 
were based on stock movements that had already taken place,” 
the Second Circuit found that net equity could not be 
ascertained by reference to them.67 However, it is worth noting 
that the plain text of the SIPA statute does not restrict net 
equity calculations to those ascertainable from the debtors’ 
books and records, but instead explicitly allows alternative 
methods that are “to the satisfaction of the trustee.”68 
Elsewhere, the court acknowledged the considerable discretion 
  
 64 See In re Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Sec., 424 B.R. 122 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010), 
aff’d, 654 F.3d 229 (2d Cir. 2011).  
 65 See generally In re Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Sec., 654 F.3d 229. A group of 
investors who would be ineligible for net equity under the decision filed an appeal with 
the Supreme Court, which denied certiorari on June 25, 2012. See Velvel v. Picard, No. 
11-986, 2012 WL 435188, at *1 (U.S. June 25, 2012); Ryan v. Picard, No. 11-969, 2012 
WL 396489, at *1 (U.S. June 25, 2012).  
 66 In re Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Sec., 654 F.3d at 237 (quoting 15 U.S.C. 
§ 78fff-2(b) (2006)) (alteration in original).  
 67 Id. at 238. 
 68 15 U.S.C. § 78fff-2(b)(2). 
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a SIPA trustee possesses in determining net equity,69 thereby 
refusing to endorse the Cash-In-Cash-Out method as the 
strategy to be pursued in each and every case.70 Thus, it is 
possible that an alternative to both the Last Statement and Net 
Investment methods exists, that this alternative is preferable as 
a matter of fairness to either of these methods, and that the 
trustee would be acting within his authority were he to pursue 
it.71 As the court itself acknowledged, it would be compelled to 
“accord a degree of deference to [the trustee’s] exercise of 
discretion so long as the method chosen by the trustee allocates 
‘net equity’ among the competing claimants in a manner that is 
not clearly inferior to other methods under consideration.”72 
With that said, since the pool of accumulated funds 
would be divided among a greater number of claimants, an 
alternative definition of net equity that enlarges the set of 
investors entitled to recovery would entail, all else being equal, a 
smaller recovery for each. This would mean that investors who 
had not recovered their principal at the time of the scheme’s 
collapse would be made less whole under this alternative than 
under the Cash-In-Cash-Out method–a problematic outcome if 
one believes that all of the investors should be restored to their 
pre-Madoff positions before any of them is entitled to profit from 
  
 69 “[I]n many circumstances a SIPA trustee may, and should, exercise some 
discretion in determining what method, or combination of methods, will best measure 
‘net equity.’” In re Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Sec., 654 F.3d at 238 n.7. Cf. Sullivan, supra 
note 9, at 1600 (noting, in the context of a bankruptcy trustee’s efforts to recover money 
for defrauded investors in a Ponzi scheme that “the court is given broad powers to rule on a 
plan of distribution, subject only to the requirement that the court use its discretion in a 
logical way to divide the money.”) (citations omitted); Spencer C. Barasch & Sara J. 
Chesnut, Controversial Uses of the “Clawback” Remedy in the Current Financial Crisis, 72 
TEX. B. J. 922, 926 (2009) (“The trustee or receiver in a Ponzi scheme has a fair amount of 
discretion in whether to pursue claims against investors and other transferees.”). 
 70 Thus the court made clear that its approach here was determined by the 
unique circumstances of the case: 
In holding that it was proper for Mr. Picard to reject the Last Statement Method, 
we expressly do not hold that such a method of calculating “net equity” is 
inherently impermissible. To the contrary, a customer’s last account statement 
will likely be the most appropriate means of calculating “net equity” in more 
conventional cases . . . . The extraordinary facts of this case make the Net 
Investment Method appropriate, whereas in many instances, it would not be.  
In re Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Sec., 654 F.3d at 238. 
 71 For example, the trustee might have determined what each Madoff 
investor would have been owed had Madoff invested all of the money he received in an 
S&P 500 index for the duration of the investment; the trustee could then have taken 
this sum as the basis for determining each investor’s pro rata share, with deductions 
for money already withdrawn.  
 72 Id. at 238 n.7. 
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the scheme. Indeed, this concern appears to animate the court’s 
second and third lines of argument.  
2. Unjust Enrichment 
In a second set of arguments, the court expressed 
concern that crediting investors with any amount of “interest” 
would leave less money in the pot with which to make losing 
investors whole.73 As an initial matter, it is certainly true that 
permitting principal plus some post hoc assignment of profits 
as the basis of recovery–rather than principal alone–would 
create a larger outstanding sum owed to investors, such that 
each losing investor would receive less than under the Net 
Investment method. But this outcome represents an 
“inequitable consequence” only if we have reason to privilege 
lost principal over lost (purported) earnings.  
Under a legitimate investment, winning customers who 
had not yet cashed out would be owed the amounts on their last 
statements, even though they had already recovered the 
amounts of their deposits and even if, because of the estate’s 
insolvency, seeking to pay the winners their outstanding profits 
would entail that losing customers would receive less than the 
full amount of their deposits in return. In other words, where 
there has been legitimate investment activity, bankruptcy law 
does not require that each investor receive his out-of-pocket 
investment amount before any investor can receive earnings on 
top of that investment. Yet, in such a case, winning investors do 
receive an “additional benefit at the expense of” losing 
investors.74 The question then arises: If the disparity isn’t unfair 
in the case of genuine investments, why does the fictitious 
nature of the investments render it unfair? The court, in its 
third argument, offers what appears to be a response.  
  
 73 “The inequitable consequence of such a scheme would be that those who 
had already withdrawn cash deriving from imaginary profits in excess of their initial 
investment would derive additional benefit at the expense of those customers who had 
not withdrawn funds before the fraud was exposed.” Id. at 238; see also id. at 235 
(quoting approvingly from the bankruptcy court’s underlying opinion, in which Judge 
Lifland argued that “[a]ny dollar paid to reimburse a fictitious profit is a dollar no 
longer available to pay claims for money actually invested.” Sec. Investor Prot. Corp. v. 
Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Sec., 424 B.R. 122, 141 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010)). 
 74 In re Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Sec., 654 F.3d at 238. 
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3. Legitimating Fraud 
In endorsing the trustee’s interpretation of net equity, 
the court stated that the “[t]rustee properly declined to 
calculate ‘net equity’ by reference to impossible transactions. 
Indeed, if the [t]rustee had done otherwise, the whim of the 
defrauder would have controlled the process that is supposed to 
unwind the fraud.”75 Part of the court’s concern arose from the 
fact that the “profits” Madoff recorded “were arbitrarily and 
unequally distributed among customers.”76 For instance, Madoff 
accorded significantly higher returns to his preferred clientele; 
the disparity in return rates had nothing to do with market 
performance and everything to do with Madoff’s whims. 
The court correctly agreed with the trustee in declining 
to countenance this aspect of the fraud. As the bankruptcy 
judge had stated–and the Second Circuit quoted approvingly–
the trustee rightly “refuse[d] to permit Madoff to arbitrarily 
decide who wins and who loses.”77 This refusal correctly 
impugns the Last Statement method, at least as it applies to 
those whose account statements were whimsically inflated by 
Madoff. But again, it does not compel the Net Investment 
method. The trustee might instead have found an objective 
measure to project the amount investors would have been owed 
had Madoff invested their money in a legitimate vehicle. In this 
way, he would not have had to rely on, let alone credit, the 
disparate ways in which Madoff treated his investors.  
Further, contrary to the suggestion of the bankruptcy 
court and Second Circuit, there is no basis for the notion that 
recognizing a recovery amount that allows interest on 
investors’ deposits involves a kind of complicity in, or 
affirmation of, the fraud.78 Indeed, one might wonder how 
seeking to make all investors whole, or fulfilling their 
“legitimate expectations,” legitimizes Madoff’s fraud, rather 
than undercuts it. After all, in a Ponzi scheme, it is presumed 
that the scheme’s operator intends to defraud or otherwise 
  
 75 Id. at 241.  
 76 Id. at 238. 
 77 Id. (quoting In re Bernard L. Madoff, 424 B.R. at 140) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
 78 See In re Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Sec., 654 F.3d at 238; In re Bernard L. 
Madoff, 424 B.R. at 136 (stating that the Net Investment method allowed Picard to 
“unwind[], rather than legitimiz[e], the fraudulent scheme”). 
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hinder his investors’ ability to recover their investment.79 A 
recovery program more expansive than Picard’s would then 
thwart, rather than serve, this presumed intention. 
In sum, the Last Statement method may well be flawed. 
But it is not at all clear that the Net Investment method is more 
justifiable, either as a matter of law or fairness. Indeed, the Net 
Investment method generates fairness concerns that extend well 
beyond the denial of the winners’ claims to any recovery.80 
C. Setting the Stage for the Clawback Actions  
To grasp the implications of the net equity decision for 
the clawback actions, it will be helpful to consider a hypothetical 
Madoff investor. Suppose, for example, that investor Smith 
opened an account with Madoff in 1980 with a one-time deposit 
of $1 million, and that he withdrew money from his account only 
once, in 2004, when he retrieved $2 million; then, on November 
30, 2008, Smith received a statement from BLMIS indicating 
that he had $8 million left in his Madoff account. How would 
Smith fare in light of the net equity decision? 
First, that decision allowed Madoff’s customers to be 
divided into two groups–“winners” and “losers.” “Winners” 
were those investors who had withdrawn more money from 
their accounts than they had deposited. “Losers,” on the other 
hand, still had some or all of their principal invested with 
Madoff at the time of the fund’s collapse, and they would 
sustain a net loss if that money were not returned to them. 
Because the amount of Smith’s 2004 withdrawal ($2 million) 
was greater than the amount of his total deposit ($1 million), 
he would be counted among the Madoff “winners.”  
Second, the decision entailed that only the Madoff “losers” 
would count as “customers” for purposes of recovering net equity. 
Net “winners,” on the other hand, would join the ranks of other 
creditors of the estate, recovering the fictitious amounts they 
thought they were owed only if the “losers” were first made 
whole.81 Thus, even though Smith reasonably relied upon the 
veracity of his BLMIS statements, including the last statement 
  
 79 See infra note 90 and accompanying text (describing the Ponzi scheme 
presumption). 
 80 See infra note __ (discussing the fairness implications of the Net 
Investment method). 
 81 See, e.g., What Is the Difference Between the Customer Fund and the 
General Estate?, MADOFF RECOVERY INITIATIVE, http://www.madoff.com/facts-08.html 
(last visited Aug. 15, 2012). 
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indicating an $8 million balance in his Madoff account, he would 
not be entitled to recover any more than $1 million under the 
Bankruptcy Court’s interpretation of net equity.  
Third, the problem is not simply that “winners” with 
open accounts would be barred from recovering any money as 
customers of the estate. They might also be required to return 
their “winnings”–i.e., all money withdrawn in excess of that 
which they had invested. Thus, Smith could be subject to a 
clawback action for the $1 million withdrew in excess of his $1 
million investment. Indeed, we now know that many real-life 
“winners” in Madoff’s Ponzi scheme, including some whom 
Picard believes to have been innocently ignorant of the fraud, 
have been named as defendants in his clawback suits. 
Finally, if the bankruptcy trustee could establish that 
Smith evinced a lack of good faith at the time that he received 
the $2 million, matters would be even worse for Smith in light 
of the bankruptcy code provision described below, which allows 
the trustee to void a transfer if the transferee knew or had 
reason to know of the fraud at the time of the transfer. In that 
case, the trustee could seek return of not just the $1 million in 
“profits” that Smith withdrew, but also the $1 million that 
represented Smith’s principal. In other words, if it were shown 
that Smith knew or had reason to know of the fraud, the entire 
$2 million transfer could be voided, leaving Smith with a net 
loss of one million real dollars.82 Here, too, there are real-world 
examples, including the clawback suit Picard filed against the 
owners of the New York Mets, whom he has accused of willful 
ignorance, and against whom he sought return of both 
principal and “profits.”83 
Critically, the net equity decision did not, as a matter of 
law or logic, compel the Trustee’s clawback suits. One could 
consistently hold both that Madoff investors with outstanding 
account balances were not eligible to recover more money than 
they had deposited and that those investors who had already 
  
 82 In Picard v. HSBC Bank PLC., Judge Jed Rakoff dismissed the bankruptcy 
trustee’s common law aiding and abetting claims against HSBC, which is accused of 
having funneled investors to Madoff, in part on the basis of the doctrine of in pari 
delicto, or “unclean hands.” 454 B.R. 25, 37 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2011). That doctrine 
prevents one wrongdoer from suing one of her fellow wrongdoers for damages arising 
from their shared wrongdoing. Id. With the HSBC decision as support, it may be that 
investors accused of bad faith will raise an in pari delicto defense. See Peter J. 
Henning, Madoff Trustee’s Job Just Became Much Tougher, N.Y. TIMES (DEALBOOK) 
(July 29, 2011), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/07/29/madoff-trustees-job-just-
became-much-tougher/. 
 83 See, e.g., Toobin, supra note 8. 
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withdrawn more than they had deposited would nonetheless get 
to keep the withdrawn “profits.” Put another way, the fact that 
“winners” would not be entitled to recovery in the bankruptcy 
proceedings need not have entailed that they would have an 
additional obligation to return the “winnings” they received 
before the bankruptcy. Thus, to return to our hypothetical 
example, Smith could have been foreclosed from seeking to 
recover the $8 million he thought he had in his Madoff account 
but permitted to keep the $2 million he had withdrawn.84  
Nonetheless, as of December 10, 2010, Picard had filed 
complaints against over one thousand investors seeking return 
of their “fictitious profits,” and in some cases their withdrawn 
principle,85 for a total possible recovery of more than $100 
billion.86 I turn now to an analysis of the doctrinal foundations 
for these suits. 
II. THE DOCTRINE OF FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE 
The term “Ponzi scheme” dates back to the infamous 
scheme perpetrated by Charles Ponzi in the early 1920s.87 Yet it 
was only in the mid-1980s that bankruptcy trustees in Ponzi 
scheme cases began to pursue clawback actions against 
  
 84 One might worry that, given that the estate was bankrupt, there would 
have been no money with which to make the losers whole unless Picard pursued 
clawbacks against innocent winners. But as I describe infra, Picard ended up filing 
clawback suits seeking a total of more than $100 billion, even though the outstanding 
principle did not amount to more than $20 billion. See infra note 85 and accompanying 
text. The $100 billion figure stemmed from claims of punitive damages in those cases 
where the trustee alleged that the transferee had known of, or been willfully blind to, 
the fraud, and so would not be permitted to keep either the principal or profits. See, 
e.g., Complaint at ¶ 8, Picard v. JPMorgan Chase & Co., 460 B.R. 84 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) 
(seeking $19 billion, comprised of money the bank earned from Madoff’s account as well 
as punitive damages). In short, there might well have been enough money to fund the 
recovery even if the innocent winners were not made to contribute to the customer 
fund. And, even if there wouldn’t have been enough money, it is not at all clear that 
that outcome would be unfair to the losers–indeed, that is just the issue I seek to 
settle here. 
 85 See, e.g., Joe Palazzolo, Picard Dealt Another Blow, WALL ST. J. LAW BLOG 
(Nov. 2, 2011, 11:34 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2011/11/02/picard-dealt-another-
blow-by-sdny/. 
 86 See, e.g., id.  
 87 See Cunningham v. Brown, 265 U.S. 1, 7-9 (1924) (discussing the collapse 
of Charles Ponzi’s fraudulent investment program); Mark A. McDermott, Ponzi 
Schemes and the Law of Fraudulent and Preferential Transfers, 72 AM. BANKR. L.J. 
157, 158 (1998). Ponzi was not the first to perpetrate the kind of fraud that now bears 
his name. In 1880, for example, Ferdinand Ward orchestrated just this kind of fraud, 
ensnaring, among others, Ulysses S. Grant. See generally GEOFFREY C. WARD, A 
DISPOSITION TO BE RICH (2012) (a recounting of Ferdinand Ward’s fraud written by a 
renowned historical writer, who happens to be the fraudster’s great-grandson).  
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innocent investors who withdrew more than they had invested 
in the scheme.88 The clawback suits rely upon a provision of the 
bankruptcy code that SIPA borrows from,89 allowing a SIPA 
trustee to void (or, to use the technical term, “avoid”) any 
transfer from the debtor’s estate that was conveyed 
fraudulently.90 More specifically, 11 U.S.C. § 548 provides that 
a bankruptcy trustee:  
may avoid any transfer . . . if the debtor voluntarily or involuntarily 
(A) made such transfer with actual intent to hinder, delay, or 
defraud any entity to which the debtor was or became, on or after 
the date that such transfer was made . . . , indebted; or (B)(i) received 
less than a reasonably equivalent value in exchange for such 
transfer . . . ; and (ii) [the debtor was insolvent, undercapitalized, or 
overextended at the time of the transfer, or he became so as a result 
of the transfer].91  
  
 88 A Westlaw search for all federal and state cases containing the terms 
“Ponzi” and “fraudulent conveyance” or “fraudulent transfer” turns up 190 cases. Only 
four of these arose before 1984. The first three stem from Charles Ponzi’s scheme itself, 
and only one of these was successful. More specifically, in Engstrom v. Lowell, the 
trustee lost because the law in question required the trustee to establish that the 
defendant–i.e., the target of the clawback suit–had actual knowledge of the fraud, 
and this the trustee failed to do. 281 F. 973, 976 (1st Cir. 1922). The trustee lost a 
second case arising from Ponzi’s fraud on similar grounds. See Cunningham v. Merchs.’ 
Nat’l Bank of Manchester, N.H., 4 F.2d 25 (1st Cir. 1925). In a 1924 opinion, the 
Supreme Court did approve the trustee’s efforts to void the withdrawals investors in 
Ponzi’s fraud made after the Boston Post exposed the fraud, Cunningham, 265 U.S. at 
9-14, but the clawbacks in that case derived not from the Bankruptcy Code’s fraudulent 
transfer provision–as Picard’s clawback suits do–but instead from its preference 
avoidance provision. I elaborate on the distinction between these two provisions below. 
See infra notes 107-109 and accompanying text. The next published opinion involving 
clawbacks from investors in a Ponzi scheme was issued in a 1966 case where the Sixth 
Circuit affirmed the District Court’s decision allowing the bankruptcy trustee to 
reclaim money received by an associate of the Ponzi schemer who was held to have had 
reason to know, if not actual knowledge of the fraud. See Conroy v. Shott, 363 F.2d 90, 
92-93 (6th Cir. 1966). That case, thus, did not involve an innocent investor. The first 
published case involving a successful avoidance action against an innocent investor on 
fraudulent conveyance grounds was decided in 1989. See Wootton v. Barge, 875 F.2d 
508, 510-11 (5th Cir. 1989). Federal bankruptcy law was overhauled in 1979, with the 
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1979 replacing the Bankruptcy Act of 1898. See, e.g., Robert 
J. White, Leveraged Buyouts and Fraudulent Conveyance Laws Under the Bankruptcy 
Code–Like Oil and Water, They Just Don’t Mix, 1991 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 357, 358 
(1991). Nonetheless, fraudulent conveyances provisions can be found in both Acts, see 
id., and Ponzi scheme cases date back to the 1920s, so the upswing in Ponzi scheme 
clawback cases cannot be attributed to the statutory change. 
 89 See 15 U.S.C. § 78fff-4(e) (2006).  
 90 Excellent overviews of the doctrine governing clawbacks in the wake of a 
Ponzi scheme can be found in Mark A. McDermott, Ponzi Schemes and the Law of 
Fraudulent and Preferential Transfers, 72 AM. BANKR. L.J. 157, 223-25 (1998); see also 
Tally M. Wiener, On the Clawbacks in the Madoff Liquidation Proceeding, 15 FORDHAM 
J. CORP. & FIN. L. 221, 223 n.7 (2009). 
 91 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1)(A)-(B) (2006). 
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Subsection (A) of the provision pertains to cases of actual fraud,92 
while subsection (B) pertains to cases of constructive fraud.93 
On its face, the text of this provision permits two 
different interpretations of the provision’s rationale. According 
to the first, the purpose of the fraudulent transfer provision is 
  
 92 Courts proceed as if there is a presumption of actual fraud in every Ponzi 
scheme case, since there will never be enough money in the scheme to provide all 
investors with a return of their principal along with the promised returns, and “since a 
failure to redeem in accordance with the investor’s expectation based on inflated 
account statements would . . . result[] in the investigation and discovery of the fraud.” 
Spencer C. Barasch & Sara J. Chesnut, Controversial Uses of the “Clawback” Remedy 
in the Current Financial Crisis, 72 TEX. B.J. 922, 926 (2009) (citing In re Bayou Grp., 
396 B.R. 810, 843 (S.D.N.Y. 2008)). See, e.g., In re Manhattan Inv. Fund Ltd., 397 B.R. 
1, 8 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (“There is a general rule–known as the ‘Ponzi scheme 
presumption’–that such a scheme demonstrates ‘actual intent’ as matter of law 
because ‘transfers made in the course of a Ponzi scheme could have been made for no 
purpose other than to hinder, delay or defraud creditors.’” (citation omitted)); Sec. & 
Exch. Comm’n v. Res. Dev. Int’l, 487 F.3d 295, 301 (5th Cir. 2007) (“In this circuit, 
proving that IERC (International Education Research Corporation) operated as a Ponzi 
scheme establishes the fraudulent intent behind the transfers it made.” (citation 
omitted)). See generally McDermott, supra note 87, at 173-74 & n.66 (collecting cases). 
Nonetheless, a lawyer representing a defendant in a clawback suit might want to argue 
that the presumption is unwarranted. The actual fraud provision refers not to the 
Ponzi scheme operator’s global or over-arching intention with respect to the scheme, 
but rather to the operator’s intentions relative to the transfers that are the subject of 
the clawback suit. It may be that the operator had no intention to defraud anyone 
when he made those transfers. Indeed, this would seem to be especially true for those 
transfers made early in the scheme, when the operator might well have believed that 
the scheme was a temporary measure, and that subsequent legitimate investments 
would allow him to recover the money that he had diverted from one investor to 
another, thereby restoring the investor whose investment had been diverted. 
 93 It is worth noting that there is a disagreement among courts as to whether 
the investor’s deposits constitute “reasonably equivalent value” for any profits she 
receives over and above the amount deposited. See, e.g., McDermott, supra note 90, at 
164-65 & n.36 (collecting cases). Judge Posner has argued that the fictitious profits 
should be subject to clawback even if one grants that the investor’s principal 
constituted fair consideration:  
We said that [the clawback target’s] profit was supported by consideration. But 
what was the source of the profit? A theft by [the ponzi scheme operator] from 
other investors. What then is [the clawback target’s] moral claim to keep his 
profit? None, even if the intent in paying him his profit was not fraudulent.  
Scholes v. Lehmann, 56 F.3d 750, 757 (7th Cir. 1995). Posner’s argument begs the 
question insofar as it privileges the “theft” that the scheme perpetrates against the 
losing investor over the fraud that the scheme perpetrates against the winning 
investor: Suppose that the debtor genuinely owed W money, and that the debtor could 
obtain the money owed only by stealing from L, and so the debtor proceeded to steal from 
L. We would think that W was required to return the money to L only if we discounted 
W’s claim to the money. But why should the debtor’s obligation to give money to W count 
for less than L’s entitlement to the stolen money? To be sure, the situation looks like the 
classic case of stolen goods, where the bona fide recipient must return the stolen good 
even if she had no reason to know it was stolen when she acquired it; Posner’s rhetoric–
referring to the Ponzi scheme as a theft–certainly underscores the force of the analogy. 
Nonetheless, I go on to discuss both the ways in which the law of stolen goods is both 
inapposite and inadequately justified. See infra Part III.B.  
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to prevent the debtor from secreting away his assets, typically 
for his own benefit, such that they are beyond the reach of his 
creditors. I refer to this as the anti-fraud reading (AF) of § 548. 
According to the second, the even distribution reading (ED), the 
purpose of the fraudulent transfer provision is to ensure the 
most even distribution of assets as possible by conferring upon 
each creditor his pro-rata share of the recovered resources.94 
Put differently, AF attends to the value of the estate, while ED 
attends to its distribution among creditors. In this Part, I argue 
that Picard’s clawback actions find support only in the ED 
reading of § 548, but that the history and text of § 548 strongly 
favor the AF reading. 
A. The Even Distribution (ED) Reading 
One could argue that the letter of the law is compatible 
with the ED reading and therefore supports the clawback 
actions. For example, subsection (B) under § 548, which is 
intended to cover instances of constructive fraud, allows for 
avoidance of a transfer “if the debtor voluntarily or 
involuntarily . . . (i) received less than a reasonably equivalent 
value in exchange for such transfer,” and (ii) the debtor was 
insolvent, undercapitalized, or overextended at the time of the 
transfer, or he became so as a result of the transfer.95 In 
defending the propriety of the Madoff clawback suits against 
this provision, one could contend that any “profits” that a 
Madoff customer withdrew were profits for which the fund 
received less than a “reasonably equivalent value.” This money 
exceeds the amount the customer had invested. Further, since 
Madoff had promised customers returns that he could not 
possibly produce–again, he hadn’t invested their deposits at 
all, so there was no way for the deposits to appreciate in 
value–he was necessarily insolvent at the time of any 
customer’s withdrawal. Thus, the winners’ “winnings” appear 
to satisfy § 548’s criteria for a constructively fraudulent 
transfer and accordingly appear subject to avoidance.  
The problem with this reasoning is that the clawback 
actions deviate from the spirit of the fraudulent transfer 
  
 94 Robert Clark uses the term “evenhandedness” to refer to one of the 
objectives of the avoidance provisions in bankruptcy law. Robert Charles Clark, The 
Duties of the Corporate Debtor to Its Creditors, 90 HARV. L. REV. 505, 511-12 (1977). As 
he explains, “the ideal of Evenhandedness toward creditors . . . connot[es] . . . equality 
of treatment of legal obligations in connection with liquidation proceedings.” Id. 
 95 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1)(B). 
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provision. More specifically, if we look at the history of the 
fraudulent transfer provision, as well as other elements of the 
statutory scheme, it becomes clear that the intent of the 
fraudulent transfer provision is not to recoup money from 
transferees like the Madoff “winners.”  
B. The Anti-Fraud (AF) Reading 
The bankruptcy code’s fraudulent transfer provision has 
its genesis in the 1571 Statute of Elizabeth,96 which is virtually 
identical in its language to the first part of the current 
fraudulent transfer provision. That 1571 law provided that 
creditors may avoid “fraudulent . . . Conveyaunces,” which were 
made with the “Intent to delaye[,] hynder[,] or defraude 
Creditors . . . .”97 By comparison, 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1) provides: 
“The trustee may avoid any transfer . . . if the debtor voluntarily 
or involuntarily–(A) made such transfer . . . with actual intent 
to hinder, delay, or defraud any entity to which the debtor was 
or became, on or after the date that such transfer was made or 
such obligation was incurred, indebted . . . .”98  
The basic idea behind the Statute of Elizabeth was to 
counteract certain kinds of mischief. For example, at the time, 
there were certain sanctuaries into which the king’s writ could 
not enter. As a result, debtors would take refuge in these 
sanctuaries, but before doing so, they would sell their assets to 
friends and family members for a nominal sum in order to 
prevent creditors from reaching them. Then, when their 
creditors finally gave up or the statute of limitations expired, 
the debtor would buy back the assets from his friends and 
family and, presumably, live happily ever after.99 To prevent 
this practice, the Statute of Elizabeth was passed. For example, 
under the statute, if the debtor sold his flock of sheep for a 
pittance, creditors could avoid the transfer and undo it, thereby 
returning the sheep to the estate so that creditors could access 
their value.100 
The untoward act that the Statute of Elizabeth 
contemplated was not one where the debtor gives money to 
  
 96 See Douglas G. Baird & Thomas H. Jackson, Fraudulent Conveyance Law 
and its Proper Domain, 38 VAND. L. REV. 829, 829-30 (1985). 
 97 13 Eliz. I, ch. 5 (1571) (Eng.), DURHAM UNIV. (UK), available at 
http://familyrecords.dur.ac.uk/nei/NEI_13Elizabeth1c5.htm (last visited Nov. 5, 2012). 
 98 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1)(A). 
 99 See Baird & Jackson, supra note 96, at 829. 
 100 The example is Baird and Jackson’s. See id. at 852.  
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creditor A and thereby leaves less in the pot for creditor B. It 
was instead the situation in which the debtor seeks to frustrate 
recovery on the part of all of his creditors, by transferring title 
of his assets to another with the express purpose of reclaiming 
them once the debtor was beyond the reach of his creditors. In 
other words, the Statute of Elizabeth did not seek an even 
distribution among all creditors. It merely sought to prevent 
situations where the debtor attempted to safeguard assets for 
his own enjoyment of them. 
The rationale behind the Statute of Elizabeth is 
enshrined in current law, as can be gleaned from various 
elements in today’s bankruptcy code. Consider, for example, 
the provision permitting avoidance of a transfer just so long as 
it was made with fraudulent intent.101 If the objective of the 
fraudulent transfer provision were to ensure an even 
distribution among creditors, it would make no sense to permit 
avoidance only where the debtor transferred assets with an 
actual or constructive fraudulent intent. For example, suppose 
that the year before our “Elizabethan deadbeat”102 became 
insolvent,103 he gave his flock of sheep to his doctor in exchange 
for medical services rendered, with no expectation of having 
the sheep returned. The transfer would not be fraudulent, and 
yet the value of the estate would be diminished to the same 
extent as in the case where the debtor has given his brother the 
flock of sheep for the sake of putting them out of his creditors’ 
reach. If we really were concerned about ensuring that all 
creditors share equally in the losses, we would require the 
doctor to return the sheep and line up with the other creditors 
for his pro rata share of the estate. Allowing the doctor to 
retain the sheep simply because they were not conveyed with a 
fraudulent intent suggests that we are not concerned with 
ensuring an even distribution.104  
  
 101 11 U.S.C. § 548(a) (2006). 
 102 Baird & Jackson, supra note 96, at 852. 
 103 The hypothetical has the transfer occur a year before insolvency so that the 
transfer of the sheep cannot be avoided as a form of preference avoidance, the reach 
back period for which is less than one year.  
 104 One might argue that the doctor is entitled to keep his sheep not because 
they were conveyed without fraudulent intent but because he qualifies for the 
“ordinary course of business” defense, as captured in contemporary law by 11 U.S.C. 
§ 547. But this is just to beg the question, for why should paying for medical services 
count as part of the fraudster’s “ordinary” business while returning money to investors 
does not? A purported distinction between the two seems to rest on the intuition that 
the doctor has provided a legitimate service to the fraudster; but the investors had no 
less reason than the doctor to believe that the transaction in which they engaged with 
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A second piece of evidence supporting the AF reading 
over the ED reading emerges from a provision in the 
bankruptcy code that allows the target of a clawback action to 
marshal a good faith defense. In particular, 11 U.S.C. § 548(c) 
provides that “a transferee . . . that takes for value and in good 
faith has a lien on or may retain any interest transferred . . . to 
the extent that such transferee . . . gave value to the debtor in 
exchange for such transfer . . . .”105 Thus, for example, consider a 
Ponzi scheme with two customers–Smith and Jones. Smith 
and Jones both invest the same amount of money at the same 
time. Neither has any idea that they are investing in a Ponzi 
scheme, nor are there any red flags that should have put them 
on notice. Six months before the Ponzi scheme is exposed, 
Smith withdraws an amount equal to his principal. Because 
Smith will have taken “for value and in good faith,” he will get 
to keep 100 percent of the money he has withdrawn. If the 
Ponzi scheme operator is completely insolvent at the time the 
scheme collapses, Jones will end up with nothing. Again, in the 
case between Smith and Jones, if the purpose of § 548 were to 
ensure an even distribution between creditors, the fact that 
Smith had taken in good faith would be irrelevant. Smith 
would instead be required to give back 50 percent of the money 
he had withdrawn in order to offset Jones’s losses. The law, 
instead, provides that Smith gets to keep the full amount of his 
withdrawal, and Jones gets nothing.106 
Moreover, the distinction between “net winners” and 
“net losers” lends further support to the AF reading. Where an 
investor has received no more than the amount she deposited, a 
  
the fraudster was legitimate. So, again, the question of the grounds for the disparity in 
treatment arises. 
 105 11 U.S.C. § 548(c) (emphasis added). 
 106 In recent years, courts have narrowed the scope of the good faith defense, 
adopting a demanding objective standard. See, e.g., In re Bayou Grp., 439 B.R. 284, 310-
12 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (describing the relevant test thusly: “The first question . . . is whether 
the transferee had information that put it on inquiry notice that the transferor was 
insolvent or that the transfer might be made with a fraudulent purpose . . . these two 
elements are consistently identified as the triggers for inquiry notice . . . . Once a 
transferee has been put on inquiry notice of either the transferor’s possible insolvency or 
of the possibly fraudulent purpose of the transfer, the transferee must satisfy a ‘diligent 
investigation’ requirement . . . . The test is most commonly phrased . . . as whether 
‘diligent inquiry would have discovered the fraudulent purpose’ of the transfer.”).  
Some commentators suggest that the narrow reading of the good faith defense is 
an intentional effort by courts to reach all payments, not just profits, so that 
early and late investors are at parity. This view is also shared by some judges, 
who view the narrow reading as judicial activism . . . . 
Sullivan, supra note 9, at 1618 (citations omitted). 
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court could consider her withdrawals to represent (fictitious) 
interest payments, rather than return of principal, in which 
case the money withdrawn would not have been offset by the 
“reasonably equivalent value” that § 548(a)(1)(B) requires. This 
would be an especially plausible way to proceed where the 
Ponzi scheme operator specifically designated the withdrawals 
as payments of interest, rather than return of principal. 
Nevertheless, courts tend to credit payments first toward 
principal and then, only after the amount deposited has been 
fully withdrawn, toward interest. Thus one court stated that 
“[i]f a given defendant received less than his [investment], the 
amounts received should be considered return of principal, 
regardless of how the parties may have designated them.”107 It 
is this treatment that allows us to consider the person who 
withdrew some money from her account–but less than she had 
invested–to be a net loser, rather than an investor who earned 
some profits from the Ponzi scheme. Yet again, if courts sought 
to achieve an even distribution among customers, it would 
make little sense to credit all payments up to the amount of the 
deposit as principal. This approach puts those payments 
beyond the bankruptcy trustee’s reach–because the investor 
has given reasonably equivalent value for these withdrawals 
under § 548(B)(i)–thereby leaving less money in the pot for 
redistribution. The fact that the doctrinal understanding of 
constructive fraud allows an innocent investor to keep the full 
amount of her principal again suggests that it does not seek an 
even distribution in the first instance. 
A final argument against the ED reading is evident 
from the fact that the bankruptcy code contains a separate 
provision that straightforwardly seeks to accomplish the goal of 
even distribution among creditors. The preference avoidance 
provisions of 11 U.S.C. § 547 state that “the trustee may avoid 
any transfer of an interest of the debtor in property” made “on 
or within 90 days before the date of the filing of the petition.” 
The underlying idea is that a debtor should not be permitted to 
play favorites in determining which creditors should have their 
debts repaid.108 Instead, all creditors of the same class should 
  
 107 Merrill v. Abbott (In re Indep. Clearing House Co.), 77 B.R. 843, 852 n.14 
(D. Utah 1987). 
 108 For a classic case that seems to involve a transfer that was both fraudulent 
and preferential, see Twyne’s Case, 76 Eng. Rep. 809, 810-13 (Star Chamber 1601). 
There, the debtor owed debts to both Twyne and C. but did not have sufficient assets to 
cover both debts. He secretly gifted the assets he possessed to Twyne, who allowed the 
debtor to continue using the assets in question. This transaction reflected both an 
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receive a distribution of the estate proportionate to what they 
are owed. Section 547 thus negates preferences among 
creditors and, in so doing, ensures an equitable distribution 
among them. Indeed, as one of the foremost treatises on 
bankruptcy law explains, “preference law . . . restructures 
transactions so as to level out the overall treatment received by 
similar creditors.”109 If the purpose of § 547 is to ensure an even 
distribution, it could not be the purpose of § 548, the fraudulent 
transfer provision, to do so as well.110 Leveraging the fraudulent 
  
unfair preference for Twyne and a fraudulent conveyance, insofar as it was conducted 
in secret with the intention of hindering C.’s recovery.  
 109 4 WILLIAM L. NORTON, JR. & WILLIAM L. NORTON, III, NORTON 
BANKRUPTCY LAW AND PRACTICE § 66:1 (3d ed. 2009) (emphasis added). 
 110 But see In re Bayou Grp., 396 B.R. 810, 827 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2008), aff’d in 
part, rev’d in part, 439 B.R. 284, 303, 338-39 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (“Section 548 serves the 
same policy function as Section 547, which allows the trustee to avoid preferential 
payments made within ninety days of the bankruptcy to perfectly innocent creditors 
who were legally entitled to be paid. Both sections represent an equitable 
determination by Congress that under limited circumstances creditors must share 
equally in the insolvency, or, in the case of Section 548, the fraud. Section 548 is not a 
punitive provision designed to punish the transferee, but is instead an equitable 
provision that places the transferee in the same position as other similarly situated 
creditors who did not receive fraudulent conveyances.”). Commentators have decried 
the Bayou decision, because it articulates an overly demanding test for establishing 
good faith. See, e.g., Sullivan, supra note 9, at 1623 (“[Bayou’s] objective good faith 
standard contravenes congressional intent, confuses the goals of fraudulent and 
preferential transfer law, unfairly penalizes savvier investors with actual good faith 
based on their status alone, demands investors to be more diligent than the SEC itself, 
and assumes (with the benefit of hindsight) that investors saw the ‘red flags.’”). Thus, 
two other opinions from the Southern District of New York–Picard v. Katz, 462 B.R. 
447, 453-57 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (Rakoff, J.), the Madoff trustee’s billion-dollar fraudulent-
transfer suit against the Mets’ owners, and Gowan v. The Patriot Grp. (In re Dreier 
LLP), 452 B.R. 391 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2011) (Glenn, J.)–have explicitly disagreed with, 
and so declined to follow, Bayou’s determination of the meaning of “good faith.” See 
generally Paul D. Sinclair & Monika Machen, Katz, Dreier Cut into Aggressive 
Trustees’ Positions, 31 AM. BANKR. INST. J., Feb. 2012, at 48.  
  More relevant here, the Bayou court’s assertion that both § 547 and § 548 
have equity as their rationale is problematic for two reasons. First, if it were true, it 
would render mysterious the different reach-back periods in §§ 547 (ninety days) and 
548 (two years); surely the fact of the bankrupt’s wrong cannot justify exposing his 
transferees to a longer reach-back period, which is to say exposing them to an 
obligation to share more in the losses. Second, if the court is correct as to the rationale 
for § 548, then its application to Ponzi scheme winners would undercut the reading of 
“net equity” advanced by the SEC, adopted by Judge Lifland and affirmed by the 
Second Circuit, see supra Part I.B. The Bayou court intends that “the transferee [be 
placed] in the same position as other similarly situated creditors who did not receive 
fraudulent conveyances.” In re Bayou Grp., 396 B.R. at 827. As applied to the Madoff 
winners and losers, then, the winners should have no more entitlement, but also no 
less, to Madoff’s estate. This would be the result if, say, all Madoff investors returned 
all of the money they had withdrawn from their Madoff accounts, and it was then 
divided among them in proportion to the amount of their investment. But the effect of 
the net equity decision is to deny winners the status of customers with valid net equity 
claims; at the same time, winners who can establish their good faith will have only 
their withdrawn profits clawed back. So, winners who cannot establish their good faith 
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transfer provision for purposes of seeking equity among 
Madoff’s customers, then, renders the preference avoidance 
provisions superfluous.111 Or, put less charitably, it is possible 
to see Picard’s efforts to use the fraudulent transfer provision 
to pursue clawbacks as an end-run around the shorter reach-
back period of a mere ninety days in the preference avoidance 
provision,112 in favor of the longer reach-back period of up to six 
years in the fraudulent transfer provision.113 
  
will come out behind the Madoff losers, while winners who proceeded in good faith will 
come out ahead. And, there is no mechanism for excluding from recovery those losers 
who did know of the fraud and, perhaps out of an excess of greed, chose to continue 
riding the Ponzi scheme wave thinking that they could get out before the scheme 
collapsed. In short, if the avoidance provisions really do seek an equitable distribution 
of the bankrupt’s assets, then the law in this area is in even more disarray than the 
text accompanying this note suggests. 
 111 But cf. Clark, supra note 94, at 510-13. Clark describes the general 
rationale for both fraudulent conveyance and preference avoidance as “that of 
Nonhindrance of the enforcement of valid legal obligations against oneself, in 
connection with transfers of one’s property. In summary, then, fraudulent conveyance 
law embodies a general ideal, in connection with a debtor’s transfers of property rights 
and incurrences of new obligations, of Nonhindrance of creditors.” In this way, Clark 
would seem to interpret both §§ 547 and 548 along the lines of what I have called the 
AF reading. Nonetheless, Clark subsequently acknowledges that the ideal of 
Evenhandedness, which underpins preference avoidance, is indeed distinct from the 
other specifications of the general commitment to Nonhindrance:  
It is also possible, however, to view Evenhandedness as a policy independent of, 
and on a par with, a general ideal of Nonhindrance, and this aspect of the policy 
has led to its development as a separate topic. While like the other two ideals 
Evenhandedness specifies the moral duties of a debtor to his creditor, 
Evenhandedness is also the ideal behind what is referred to as the law of 
voidable preferences and many cases assume or state explicitly that a preference 
is not a fraudulent conveyance.  
Id. at 513. 
 112 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(4)(A) (2006). At least one court has decried § 547’s short 
statute of limitations when it comes to Ponzi schemes:  
For a Ponzi scheme that lasts more than three months, the statute[] . . . does not 
go far enough. By definition, an enterprise engaged in a Ponzi scheme is 
insolvent from day one. Thus, all transfers to investors in a Ponzi scheme are 
preferential, not just those made within the three months before bankruptcy. 
Every transfer prefers the transferee to those investors at the end of the line. 
The evil of a preferential transfer is that it “unfairly permit[s] a particular 
creditor to be treated more favorably than other creditors of the same class.” All 
investors in a Ponzi scheme are creditors of the same class, so in theory all 
should be treated equally. In effect, though, applying section 547 to a Ponzi 
scheme . . . favors some creditors over others. Under section 547 the creditors 
who are most preferred are allowed to keep their preferential payments because 
the transfers were made outside the statutory period . . . . The statute simply 
does not reach the early investors. Thus, applying the statute as written, the 
court is “compelled to take part in a farce whose result is . . . to take away from 
those who have little, the little that they have.” The equitable solution would be 
either to apply the statute to all transfers to investors in a Ponzi scheme–
without regard to when the transfers were made–or to apply the statute to none 
of the transfers.  
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All of this shows that the AF reading is on far firmer 
ground than is the ED reading. Treatise writers and 
distinguished jurists seem to agree. Thus, one of the classic 
bankruptcy law treatises states that “the intent of [fraudulent 
conveyance statutes] . . . is not to provide equal distribution of 
the estates of debtors among their creditors; there are other 
statutes [in bankruptcy] which have that effect.”114 A leading 
  
In re Indep. Clearing House Co., 77 B.R. 843, 871 (D. Utah 1987) (citations omitted). 
  Other commentators have noted that the short reach-back period of the 
preference avoidance provision might have impelled courts to adopt expansive 
understandings of the circumstances under which a fraudulent transfer has arisen. 
See, e.g., Cherry & Wong, supra note 15, at 404 (“[B]ecause the typical losing investor 
nonetheless remains at an unfair disadvantage, courts have sought to rectify the 
balance . . . . [C]ourts have begun to adopt a narrower reading of the good faith defense 
so as to potentially reach all payments received by an investor from the scheme . . . not 
just . . . fictitious profits.” (citation omitted)). At least some of these commentators 
welcome this expansive reading. See id. Those who have decried the expansion do so on 
separation of powers grounds, and not on the fairness-based grounds I adduce here. See, 
e.g., Sullivan, supra note 9, at 1634-35; Lustig v. Weisz (In re Unified Commercial 
Capital, Inc.), 260 B.R. 343, 349-50 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 2001) aff’d sub nom. In re Unified 
Commercial Capital, No. 01-MBK-6004L, 2002 WL 32500567 (W.D.N.Y. June 21, 2002). 
[Some c]ourts . . . appear to believe that a “just” solution to the losses suffered by 
the innocent investors in a “Ponzi” scheme requires some reallocation of the risks 
and redistribution of the losses beyond that provided for by Congress in Section 
547(b) . . . . [T]he fraudulent conveyance statutes cannot and should not be 
utilized by courts as a super preference statute to effect a further reallocation 
and redistribution that should be specifically provided for in a statute enacted by 
Congress. The Section 548(a) and state law fraudulent conveyance statutes 
implement a policy of preventing the diminution of a debtor’s estate. The Section 
547(b) preference statute implements a principal policy of equality of 
distribution. By forcing the square peg facts of a “Ponzi” scheme into the round 
holes of the fraudulent conveyance statutes in order to accomplish a further 
reallocation and redistribution to implement a policy of equality of distribution 
in the name of equity, I believe that many courts have done a substantial 
injustice to those statutes and have made policy decisions that should be made 
by Congress.  
In re Unified Commercial Capital, Inc., 260 B.R. at 349-50. 
 113 Section 548 authorizes avoidance of transfers made only in the two years 
prior to the declaration of bankruptcy. See 11 U.S.C. § 548 (2006). However, § 544(b) of 
the Code allows the trustee to avoid fraudulent conveyances based on state law, 11 U.S.C. 
§ 544(b), and the New York fraudulent transfer provision allows for a six year reach-back 
period, N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 213 (McKinney 2012). In the case against the Mets owners, Judge 
Rakoff held that the bankruptcy trustee could proceed against the defendants only upon a 
theory of actual fraud, as articulated in 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1)(A), which limited the reach 
back period to two years (and the recovery amount to $384 million, rather than the $1 
billion the trustee had sought). See Katz, 462 B.R. at 451. It is not yet clear what effect, if 
any, this ruling will have on the other Madoff claw back suits and, in particular, on the 
allowable reach-back period. 
 114 1 GARRARD GLENN, FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES AND PREFERENCES § 289 
(rev. ed. 1940) (quoting In re Johnson, 20 Del. Ch. 389 (1881)) (internal quotation 
marks omitted); see also Peter L. Borowitz & Richard F. Hahn, The Troubled Leveraged 
Buyout: Risks (and Opportunities) Under Fraudulent Conveyance and Other Creditors’ 
Rights Laws, in 694 PRACTISING LAW INSTITUTE: CORPORATE LAW AND PRACTICE 
COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES 51, 53-54 (“In its original form fraudulent conveyance law 
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bankruptcy law casebook states that the “purpose of fraudulent 
conveyance law, whatever its form, is simple; it protects a 
debtor’s unsecured creditors from reductions in the debtor’s 
estate to which they generally look for their security.”115 In a 
First Circuit Court of Appeals decision, then-Judge Stephen 
Breyer stated that one of the “basic functions” of fraudulent 
conveyance law is “to see that an insolvent debtor’s limited 
funds are used to pay some worthy creditor,” and not to 
“determin[e] which creditor is the more worthy.”116 Breyer’s 
conception has subsequently been endorsed by the Second 
Circuit Court of Appeals,117 as well as numerous federal district 
and bankruptcy courts.118 In short, according to all of these 
sources, contemporary law allows fraudulent conveyances to be 
avoided because they are fraudulent, not because they risk 
creating a disparity between creditors of the same class. 
But even if the bankruptcy code was not intended to be 
used to take money from some innocent Ponzi scheme investors 
and provide it to others, perhaps we should nonetheless refrain 
from opposing the clawback actions. After all, any money that a 
Madoff customer withdrew over and above that which she 
invested was money that another Madoff customer had 
deposited. In many cases, sheer luck will have allowed some 
Madoff investors to come out ahead, while others come out with 
little or nothing. Why should luck be so decisive, especially if the 
winners’ “winnings” come directly from the losers’ pockets? 
Indeed, Picard has relied on precisely this logic in defending the 
clawback suits to the general public. Yet despite its intuitive 
appeal, this rationale turns out to be quite problematic. 
III. UNJUST ENRICHMENT AND STOLEN GOODS 
In seeking to justify avoidance actions filed against 
innocent and (allegedly) knowing investors alike, Picard has 
  
focused exclusively on transfers of a debtor’s property where there was actual evidence 
of the debtor’s intent to harm its creditors by hiding assets from imminent levy.”). 
 115 MARK S. SCARBERRY ET AL., BUSINESS REORGANIZATION IN BANKRUPTCY: 
CASES AND MATERIALS 387 (3d ed. 2006). 
 116 Boston Trading Grp. v. Burnazos, 835 F.2d 1504, 1511 (1st Cir. 1987); see 
also id. at 1509 (“[T]he basic object of fraudulent conveyance law is to see that the 
debtor uses his limited assets to satisfy some of his creditors; it normally does not try to 
choose among them.”). 
 117 See, e.g., In re Sharp Intern. Corp., 403 F.3d 43, 54 (2d Cir. 2005); HBE 
Leasing Corp. v. Frank, 48 F.3d 623, 634 (2d Cir. 1995).  
 118 See, e.g., In re Jeffrey Bigelow Design Grp., 956 F.2d 479, 484 (4th Cir. 
1992); In re Pearlman, 460 B.R. 306, 312, (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2011); In re Aphton Corp., 
423 B.R. 76, 93 (Bankr. D. Del. 2010).  
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been quite savvy in his choice of language. In a quote to the 
Wall Street Journal, Picard exclaimed that “the people who 
made money, who got more, have made money at the expense 
of the people who didn’t.”119 Putting the point even more 
starkly, he subsequently described the disparity between 
winners and losers by stating that, “for more than 20 years, 
Bernard Madoff stole money from some people and gave it to 
others.”120 Echoing this rhetoric, Picard’s lieutenant, David 
Sheehan, stated that “[t]hose who didn’t get their money back 
are entitled to get it from those who have it.”121  
These statements have great intuitive appeal, as they 
rely upon an implicit analogy to two well-established doctrines–
namely, the law of unjust enrichment and the law of stolen 
goods. For both of these doctrines, one party may be compelled to 
return money or goods illicitly taken from their original owner, 
even if the former is completely innocent of the illicit taking. 
Picard and Sheehan’s rhetoric implies that we should conceive of 
the winners as the innocent recipients of ill-gotten gains or 
stolen goods, in which case, compelling the winners to return 
their “winnings” to the losers would be consistent with the 
doctrines governing unjust enrichment and stolen goods.  
Picard is not alone in seeking to leverage this rhetoric. 
Both the Securities Investor Protection Corporation and the 
trustees charged with recovering assets in the wake of other 
Ponzi schemes have also sought to support clawback suits by 
analogizing the transfers they seek to avoid to instances of 
unjust enrichment or stolen goods.122 It behooves us, then, to 
  
 119 Michael Rothfeld, Madoff Investors Brace for Lawsuits, WALL ST. J., at C1, 
July 26, 2010, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/ 
SB10001424052748704719104575389141620473502.html (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 120 The Madoff Recovery Effort: An Update Call with the Trustee and His 
Counsel from Baker Hostetler (Mar. 8, 2011, 3:00 PM), at 1, available at 
http://207.58.180.20/document/news/000018-2011-march-8-picard-sheehan-opening-
statements-for-march-8-press-call.pdf; see also Alan Rappeport, 123 Claims Filed over 
Madoff Payouts, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 1, 2010, at 25, available at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/ 
0aa84be4-fcdf-11df-ae2d-00144feab49a.html#axzz1os4RzPPa (quoting from the complaint 
for the clawback suit filed against a hedge fund operator in which Picard alleges that 
“[t]he transfers received by the defendant constitute non-existent profits supposedly 
earned in the account, but, in reality, they were other people’s money . . . .” (internal 
quotation marks omitted)). 
 121 Madoff Recovery, supra note 120, at 6. Joe Nocera, the New York Times 
columnist, echoes these words in his arguments supporting the clawback suits: “[T]he 
net winners’ gains came from the pockets of the net losers. That’s how a Ponzi scheme 
works. If you buy a stolen watch, and its real owner wants it back, don’t you have an 
obligation to return it?” Joe Nocera, Suspense Is Over in Madoff Case, N.Y. TIMES, June 
26, 2012, at A23.  
 122 Thus, the receiver appointed by the SEC in the Stanford International 
Bank fraud has sought to recover money from innocent beneficiaries of the Ponzi 
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consider the force of the analogies. In this Part, I address each 
of the purportedly analogous doctrines in turn.  
A. The Law of Unjust Enrichment 
The law of unjust enrichment holds that “[a] person has 
a right to have restored to him a benefit gained at his expense 
by another, if the retention of the benefit by the other would be 
unjust.”123 An unjust enrichment analysis includes the following 
inquiries: “(i) Was the defendant enriched? (ii) Was it at the 
expense of the claimant? (iii) Was it unjust?”124 An affirmative 
answer to each of these questions entails that a defendant has 
been unjustly enriched. Such a defendant will be required to 
restitute the plaintiff, unless the defendant can marshal an 
established defense.125  
A recitation of the bare elements of the doctrine of 
unjust enrichment cannot tell us whether the Madoff winners 
were in fact unjustly enriched. For one thing, whether the 
winners’ profits were accrued at the expense of the losers turns 
on whether the losers maintain a claim to the money that the 
winners received. This is precisely the question under debate. 
Suppose that the winners and losers invested in Schmadoff’s 
legitimate investment scheme instead of Madoff’s fraud. 
Suppose further that the investment scheme, while profitable 
for many years, suddenly goes bust as a result of an 
  
scheme by advancing, inter alia, a claim that they were unjustly enriched. Receiver’s 
First Amended Complaint Against Certain Stanford Investors ¶¶ 39-42, Janvey v. 
Alguire, 846 F. Supp. 2d 662 (N.D. Tex. 2011) (No. 03:09-CV-0724-N), available at 
http://www.stanfordfinancialreceivership.com/documents/Receivers_First_Amended_ 
Complaint_Against_Certain_Stanford_Investors.pdf. And, the SIPC, in a brief 
supporting the trustee’s interpretation of net equity, argued that:  
[u]nless the fictitious trades in BLMIS are avoided, claimants who were 
advantaged by the broker’s fraud, that is, investors who received withdrawals 
from BLMIS that actually consisted of other investors’ money under the guise of 
investment profits . . . will be allowed to benefit at the expense of other equally 
innocent investors.  
Memorandum of Law of the Securities Investor Protection Corporation in Support of 
Trustee’s Motion for an Order Upholding Trustee’s Determination Denying “Customer” 
Claims for Amounts Listed on Last Statement, Affirming Trustee’s Determination of 
Net Equity, and Expunging Those Objections with Respect to the Determinations 
Relating to Net Equity at 36, SIPC v. Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Sec. (In re Bernard L. 
Madoff Inv. Sec.), No. 08-01789 (BRL) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Oct. 16, 2009), available at 
http://www.madofftrustee.com/document/dockets/000450-519-memorandum-of-law.pdf. 
 123 Warren Seavey & Austin Scott, Restitution, 54 LAW Q. REV. 29, 32 (1938). 
See generally id. at 36-37 (collecting paradigmatic statements of the doctrine). 
 124 BIRKS, supra note 9, at 39. 
 125 Id. 
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extraordinary event that no one could have predicted and that 
was no one’s fault. For example, imagine that a meteor strikes 
the building where Schmadoff had his offices and destroys the 
vault where he had stored half of the investors’ money in 
anticipation of a large stock purchase, while the other half was 
already invested in the market. Although Schmadoff’s firm was 
appropriately insured, insurance does not cover this 
contingency, and so half of the money investors thought they 
had is gone. Over the years, some investors withdrew more 
money than they had deposited, while other investors had not 
recouped all, or even any, of their principal at the time of the 
vault’s destruction. The former set of investors would have 
been enriched, but it seems a stretch to say that they were 
enriched at the expense of the latter, even though their 
withdrawals have left fewer resources to be distributed among 
the latter. Similarly, the Madoff winners’ withdrawals have 
also left fewer resources to be distributed among the losers. But 
why should we think that their “winnings” come at the expense 
of the losers if we do not think that the Schmadoff winners gain 
at the expense of the Schmadoff losers? 
Even if the Madoff winners (and perhaps the Schmadoff 
winners, too) have gained at the expense of the losers, it is not 
at all clear that they have gained unjustly. The paradigmatic 
case of unjust enrichment involves the mistaken payment of a 
non-existent debt,126 such as when A forgets that she has already 
discharged her debt to B and pays B twice. Clearly, the Madoff 
case is distinct from this paradigmatic case. Other cases involve 
“failures of consideration, shades of fraud and pressure, and 
taking advantage of vulnerable people.”127 The second of these 
factors is most apt here, and it might ground the losers’ right to 
recovery under the following established principle: “If X takes 
C’s money without C’s consent and gives it to D, then D becomes 
indebted to C in the sum received.”128 Here, X would be Madoff, D 
a winner, and C a loser, and the principle would apply so long as 
  
 126 Id. at 5, 73 (referring to this case as “the core of the core” of unjust enrichment 
doctrine); Dennis Klimchuk, The Normative Foundations of Unjust Enrichment, in THE 
LAW OF UNJUST ENRICHMENT 81, 82 (Robert Chambers et al., eds., 2009). 
 127 BIRKS, supra note 9, at 40 (citing these, along with cases of mistake, as an 
exclusive list of unjust factors).  
 128 Id. at 86 (distilling the principle behind the House of Lords’s decision in 
Lipkin Gorman v. Karpnale Ltd., [1991] 2 A.C. 548 (H.L.) (Eng.)). Cf. Zoe Sinel, Through 
Thick and Thin: The Place of Corrective Justice in Unjust Enrichment, 31 OXFORD J. 
LEGAL STUD. 551, 551 (2011) (“Clearly, one should return what one was not meant to 
receive and for which one gave nothing in return.”). 
36 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 78:1 
we were licensed in construing the case as one in which Madoff 
took the losers’ money without their consent. 
In response, one might point to an exception to the 
principle and contend that D need not return the money to C if 
D received it in exchange for a bona fide purchase. Thus, if an 
attorney embezzles money from his law firm and uses it to buy 
himself a lavish dinner at the Ritz, the Ritz need not return 
any of the proceeds of the meal to the law firm, because it 
supplied the food and drink in exchange for the money paid.129 
Moreover, this result holds even if the Ritz marks up its prices 
exorbitantly to ensure that its profit margin is, for example, 
ninety percent of the purchase price.130  
Leveraging this exception, one might argue that the 
Madoff winners are like suppliers of goods who receive ill-
gotten gains in a genuine, legitimate exchange. This will not 
do, however. If Madoff’s fraud vitiates the claimant’s consent 
and thereby renders the transfer between a losing investor and 
Madoff illicit, then so too it vitiates the legitimacy of the 
exchange between Madoff and the winning investor.  
As such, this appears to be a case where the law of 
unjust enrichment would compel the Madoff winners to return 
their winnings to the Madoff losers.131 But it is just at this point 
that the law of unjust enrichment is on its weakest footing. To 
be sure, courts have found that defendants must return funds 
that have been “misdirected from the plaintiff’s bank account 
or trust fund by a fraudulent . . . third party,”132 even though 
the defendant bears no responsibility for the fraud. The 
rationale in these cases emphasizes the plaintiff’s lack of 
responsibility for the transfer; the defendant’s lack of 
responsibility is taken to be irrelevant.133 But why should this 
be? As Kit Barker asks, “Why is the defendant, who is no more 
causally implicated in events than anyone else, obliged to 
  
 129 The example is Birk’s variation on the Lipkin Gorman case. BIRKS, supra 
note 9, at 86. 
 130 Id.  
 131 Assuming, as I am in this Section, that the Madoff winners in question 
were blamelessly ignorant of the fraud, they would have rights of rescission that 
protected money withdrawn equal to the principle they had invested. See, e.g., Katz, 
supra note 11, at 453-54 (describing the transferee’s right of rescission as an 
antecedent debt of the estate, owed in exchange for the value the transferee had 
invested with the debtor). 
 132 Kit Barker, The Nature of Responsibility for Gain: Gain, Harm and Keeping 
the Lid on Pandora’s Box, in THE LAW OF UNJUST ENRICHMENT 162 (Robert Chambers et 
al. eds., 2009) (citations omitted) (citing relevant caselaw).  
 133 Barker, supra note 132, at 165-66. 
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remedy the plaintiff’s bad luck? Is there not an equally strong 
case, for example, for compensating the plaintiff . . . from a 
public fund, rather than looking to private law for a 
restitutionary remedy?”134 Indeed, one might make the point 
more forcefully by arguing that imposing the remedy 
exclusively on the defendant treats him as a mere means. It 
“uses the defendant as an instrument in the service of the 
plaintiff’s interests.”135  
One can find two responses to these queries in the 
scholarly literature on unjust enrichment, but neither is 
ultimately convincing. First, some have suggested that liability 
here vindicates not the plaintiff’s particular interest but 
instead “the value of autonomy more generally, a value in 
which the defendant can be understood to have an interest, no 
less than the plaintiff. So liability does not treat the defendant 
as a mere means.”136 The argument seems to be that both the 
plaintiff and the defendant gain from the imposition of liability 
insofar as liability vindicates the autonomy of each. But a 
problem remains. The prospect, or even reality, of gain does not 
undercut the concern that the defendant is being used as a 
mere means. Analogously, we might say that, in cases of false 
conviction, the innocent individual who is punished shares in a 
benefit that her punishment produces–namely, the general 
deterrence that will make others less likely to commit a similar 
crime and that will make the defendant less likely to be 
victimized by such a crime. Still, the defendant is being treated 
as a mere means because she is singled out for punishment 
without cause, even if she, along with others, enjoys the benefit 
her punishment generates. The defendant serves as an 
instrument for the gain, even if the gain is one in which she 
can partake. 
A second line of response acknowledges that “there is 
nothing uniquely, morally significant” about the defendant who 
is innocent of the fraud from which he gains.137 Nonetheless, it 
makes sense to have him “insure” the plaintiff against her loss 
“because he happens to have an obvious surplus fund” (i.e., the 
  
 134 Id. at 166. 
 135 Klimchuk, supra note 126, at 97. Klimchuk is trying to rescue Hanoch 
Dagan’s account of unjust enrichment, according to which the doctrine is intended to 
vindicate the value of autonomy generally. See, e.g., HANOCH DAGAN, THE LAW AND 
ETHICS OF RESTITUTION (2004).  
 136 Klimchuk, supra note 126, at 97. 
 137 Barker, supra note 132, at 168 (emphasis omitted). 
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proceeds deriving from the plaintiff’s loss).138 Along these lines, 
some allege that a “localised” or “internal” distributive norm 
operates between the plaintiff and defendant such that 
fairness, rather than corrective justice, compels return of the 
money.139 Regardless of the justificatory force of this reasoning 
in the standard case of unjust enrichment from a fraud 
involving a passive defendant, it is not at all clear that it 
applies convincingly to the Madoff clawback suits. The Madoff 
winner had a legitimate expectation that his investment would 
yield returns; therefore his withdrawals might not constitute 
“an obvious surplus fund.” Even those who believe that fairness 
normally dictates return of the transferred funds recognize an 
exception where returning the transferred funds would cause 
the defendant to suffer harm himself.140 In the Madoff case, the 
winners relied on the legitimacy of their “winnings”; many of 
them spent that money thinking that it had been honestly 
invested and earned.141 Because the money that winners would 
be forced to give up is not a surplus, they would be worse off at 
the end of the day.142 Put differently, fairness does not 
necessarily compel the result that arises in the standard case of 
unjust enrichment, and that the Madoff trustee demands.143  
In sum, one can say that the winners in the Madoff case 
have been unjustly enriched only if (i) they have been enriched 
at the expense of the losers, and (ii) the circumstances of their 
  
 138 Id. 
 139 See id. at 167 (discussing Dennis Klimchuk, Unjust Enrichment and 
Corrective Justice, in UNDERSTANDING UNJUST ENRICHMENT 111 (J. Neyers et al. eds., 
2004) and PETER CANE, RESPONSIBILITY IN LAW AND MORALITY 208 (2002)).  
 140 See, e.g., HANOCH DAGAN, UNJUST ENRICHMENT 40 (2004); Barker, supra 
note 132, at 168. 
 141 See, e.g., Madoff’s Victims, MADOFFSCANDAL.COM: THE LARGEST FRAUD 
THAT THE WORLD HAS EVER SEEN, http://www.madoffscandal.com/madoffs-victims/ 
(last visited Mar. 12, 2012) (describing Ira Roth, whose withdrawals from his Madoff 
account were used to pay for his college tuition and his grandmother’s living expenses). 
 142 See Barker, supra note 132, at 168. 
 143 Picard has instituted a hardship program, such that winners who can 
demonstrate hardship will be excused from having to return their “winnings.” See The 
Hardship Program, MADOFF RECOVERY INITIATIVE, http://www.madoff.com/hardship-
program-17.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2012). The hardship standard that Picard has 
set is an onerous one. Among the factors Picard lists in order to qualify for the 
hardship program are the following: “[i]nability to pay for necessary living expenses, 
such as housing (including loss of home due to foreclosure), food, utilities and 
transportation”; “[i]nability to pay for necessary medical expenses”; “[i]nability to pay 
for the care of dependents”; and having “[d]eclar[ed] personal bankruptcy.” Id. Yet even 
a more liberal standard would not vitiate the concern raised in the text accompanying 
this note. Again, the concern is that the defendant may have reasonably relied on the 
legitimacy of his earnings and so reasonably spent the money that the trustee now 
claims belongs to the plaintiff. Requiring the defendant to repay that money leaves him 
worse off even if he is not otherwise financially strapped.  
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enrichment involve an injustice. But whether or not these 
conditions apply depends on our understanding of the 
entitlements of winners and losers alike. The law of unjust 
enrichment does not illuminate, let alone determine, those 
entitlements. Only a prior inquiry into the relationship that 
ought to exist between winners and losers can do so, and I 
undertake that inquiry in Part V. It will be useful to turn to the 
law of stolen goods first, however, to see whether it can provide 
useful insights. 
B. The Law of Stolen Goods 
The rule requiring a person who unwittingly purchases a 
stolen item to return that item is a fixture of Anglo-American 
law and is among the legal rules widely known by the layperson 
and legal sophisticate alike. The “He who hath not cannot give” 
rule dates back to Roman times,144 and today it can be found in 
the UCC,145 as well as in the UCC’s English counterpart.146 Yet, 
notwithstanding the entrenched nature of the rule governing 
stolen goods, it turns out that there is little to support it, and it 
is largely irrelevant to the Madoff case in any event.  
Why does the law favor the original owner over the good 
faith purchaser of a stolen item? There are two kinds of 
rationales adduced in support of the rule–those grounded in 
considerations of efficiency, and those grounded in considerations 
of fairness. Under the former, it has been argued that resting 
priority with the original owner encourages vigilance on the part 
of would-be purchasers to ensure proper title in the item they are 
thinking about purchasing.147 Prioritizing the original owner also 
deters theft, by making it more difficult for the thief to off-load 
the fruits of his crime. Yet considerations of efficiency might 
weigh just as strongly on the other side. We might instead want 
to encourage vigilance on the part of owners to ensure that they 
protect their possessions or purchase insurance to cover their 
losses. And we might want to ensure the fluidity of the market 
for goods by conferring upon the good faith purchaser a sense of 
  
 144 See, e.g., BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 813 (2nd ed. 1910). 
 145 “A purchaser of goods acquires all title which his transferor had or had 
power to transfer.” U.C.C. § 2-403 (1989). 
 146 “[W]here goods are sold by a person who is not their owner, and who does not 
sell them under the authority or with the consent of the owner, the buyer acquires no 
better title to the goods than the seller had.” The Sale of Goods Act, 1979, § 21(1) (U.K.). 
 147 See, e.g., Derek Fincham, Towards a Rigorous Standard for the Good Faith 
Acquisition of Antiquities, 37 SYRACUSE J. INT’L L. & COM. 145, 162 (2010). 
40 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 78:1 
repose.148 So long as he had no reason to know that his purchase 
had been stolen from someone else, he may rest easy in the 
belief that it will not be repossessed should its origins be 
uncovered. For precisely these reasons, the rule operates the 
opposite way in civil law countries, where good faith 
purchasers typically enjoy priority and original owners are 
denied recovery. In sum, the efficiency-based considerations for 
the rule of stolen goods are hardly decisive in establishing the 
original owner’s priority. But nor are the fairness-based 
considerations, we shall now see.  
Fairness seeks to favor the original owner on the 
presupposition that the original owner will have imbued the 
item with more personal meaning than the good faith 
purchaser. Where the property in question is “personal” under 
Margaret Jane Radin’s conception of that term–being bound 
up with its original owner’s conception of herself–it makes 
sense to return the item to the original owner.149 Thus, for 
example, we can imagine a wedding ring that had been in the 
original owner’s family over multiple generations, and for that 
reason carries a personal dimension that the good faith 
purchaser could not appreciate. Fairness would dictate that we 
privilege the property rights of the original owner, who values 
the ring for both pecuniary and sentimental reasons, over those 
of the good faith purchaser, who has only a pecuniary 
attachment to the ring.  
A second fairness-based consideration goes not to the 
enhanced value the item might hold for the original owner, but 
instead to the circumstances of its theft. In these instances, the 
original owner has had the item taken from her against her 
will.150 As in cases of Nazi-looted art for example, where the 
item was stolen as part of a genocidal campaign,151 we might 
say that the original owner has sustained not only a material 
loss but also an expressive injury, given the ethnic animus 
motivating the crime. In this kind of case, the original owner 
has borne the greater loss and, in recognition of that fact, 
fairness would again dictate return of the stolen good. 
  
 148 See Emily A. Graefe, Note, The Conflicting Obligations of Museums 
Possessing Nazi-Looted Art, 51 B.C. L. REV. 473, 481 (2010). 
 149 See Margaret J. Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957 (1982).  
 150 Menachem Mautner, “The Eternal Triangles of the Law”: Toward a Theory 
of Priorities in Conflicts Involving Remote Parties, 90 MICH. L. REV. 95, 151-52 (1991). 
 151 See, e.g., Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677 (2004) (affirming a judgment in 
favor of the plaintiff, who sued the Austrian government for the return of six Gustav 
Klimt paintings that had belonged to her family prior to the Holocaust).  
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Both of these rationales strike me as no more than 
presumptively compelling. In many cases, the more personal 
attachment or the more injurious loss may reside on the side of 
the original owner. But there will surely be exceptions. For 
example, if the good faith purchaser had sold his kidney in 
order to acquire the funds to buy the wedding ring that had 
been an heirloom in the original owner’s family, we might 
imagine that his fiancée attaches special significance to the 
ring in light of the sacrifice made to get it for her. This 
significance might be no less compelling than the significance 
that the ring holds for its original owner. Similarly, the original 
owner might have sustained a garden-variety theft, while the 
good faith purchaser was duped into buying the stolen good as 
part of a scam that exploits a special vulnerability, causing 
suffering to the good faith purchaser and members of her 
group. This is the case in instances of affinity fraud, in which 
the fraudster preys upon others with whom he shares ethnic or 
religious ties.152 In these cases, the good faith purchaser will 
have been subject to an expressive injury (such as one 
motivated by ethnic or racial animus) while the original owner 
was not. In sum, the fairness rationales appear to provide 
merely presumptive reasons for privileging the original owner, 
not absolute grounds for doing so. 
In any event, it is difficult to see why these rationales 
should be relevant when we are dealing with a fungible good, 
such as money. The family ring or Nazi-looted Gustav Klimt 
painting cannot be shared by two owners, but money can easily 
be divided between them. So we need not think about 
privileging the winner or the loser of an investment fraud in 
the same way that we need to contemplate privileging the 
original owner or the good faith purchaser for a theft of a 
unique object. 
Moreover, there is a further distinction between a case 
of stolen goods and financial fraud that is worth underscoring. 
In the case of a financial fraud like Madoff’s, each investor was 
a potential victim of theft. To return to our two-person Ponzi 
scheme involving Smith and Jones, consider the following: 
  
 152 The SEC defines an affinity fraud as fraud that “prey[s] upon members of 
identifiable groups, such as religious or ethnic communities, the elderly, or professional 
groups. The fraudsters who promote affinity scams frequently are . . . members of the 
group . . . . These scams exploit the trust and friendship that exist in groups of people 
who have something in common.” Affinity Fraud: How to Avoid Investment Scams that 
Target Groups, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, http://www.sec.gov/investor/pubs/affinity.htm 
(last modified Sept. 6, 2006). 
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Although Smith cashed out early and Jones was left exposed, 
the situation could have proceeded precisely the opposite way, 
with Jones cashing out early and Smith bearing the loss. 
Further, it is not simply that either of them could have been the 
victim of fraud. Each was the victim of fraud. This is true not 
only in those cases where winning investors believed they had 
money left in their Madoff accounts but later learned that they 
would not recover it based on the bankruptcy court’s definition of 
net equity. Even the investor who had liquidated her account 
and received exactly the amount she believed she was owed can 
be said to have been a victim of fraud insofar as she invested her 
money under false pretenses. Both were the intended “dupees” of 
a fraudster; that only one of them suffered the pecuniary 
consequences of having been duped is merely a matter of luck, 
for which neither bears responsibility. There is, accordingly, a 
moral equivalence between Smith and Jones, and between any 
innocent winner and innocent loser in a Ponzi scheme. By 
contrast, there need not be a moral equivalence between the 
good faith purchaser of a stolen good and the individual from 
whom it was stolen; this will especially be the case where the 
good has changed hands more than once, and the last seller was 
innocently ignorant of the good’s illicit provenance. 
In sum, the law of stolen goods derives its rationale from 
a set of potentially dubious presumptions, and these have little 
relevance to the relationship between Ponzi scheme winners and 
losers in any case. Further, even if one were to remain convinced 
that fairness demands loss sharing among Ponzi scheme 
winners and losers, it would nevertheless be unfair to proceed 
with the clawback suits, given that we do not require innocent 
beneficiaries of other kinds of wrongs to share in the losses that 
the victims of those wrongs sustain, as we shall now see. 
IV. OTHER ANALOGOUS DOCTRINES?  
The legal response to the Madoff case cannot be 
assessed in isolation. The Madoff Ponzi scheme collapsed at the 
same time as–and as a result of–the 2008 financial 
meltdown. With stock values plummeting, Madoff’s customers 
sought to withdraw their money en masse, but Madoff was 
unable to satisfy all of their claims at once. We know now that 
the financial crisis was precipitated in no small part by acts of 
wrongdoing. Fraud itself increased in the years preceding the 
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meltdown.153 Moreover, among the acts and events identified to 
have caused the crisis, instances of recklessness, willful 
blindness, and exploitation figure prominently.154 Yet the 
response to the financial crisis has all but eschewed any grand-
scale attempt to compensate those who lost money through no 
fault of their own. This Part seeks to distinguish the clawback 
suits against innocent winners in a Ponzi scheme from other 
restitutionary measures that adversely affect innocent 
beneficiaries of a corporate or financial wrong. In Part IV.A, I 
focus on executive compensation, while in Part IV.B I address 
shareholder losses resulting from corporate or financial wrongs.  
A. Executive Compensation Clawbacks  
Outside of the avoidance provisions of bankruptcy laws, 
the only individuals who are eligible targets for clawback 
actions are corporate executives, and only when their 
companies issue earnings restatements to correct for earlier 
mistaken earnings reports.155 More specifically, each of the 
  
 153 See Page Perry, LLC, Financial Scams Are Becoming More Common as the 
Economy Deteriorates, INVESTMENT FRAUD LAWYER BLOG (Apr. 13, 2009), 
http://www.investmentfraudlawyerblog.com/2009/04/financial_scams_are_becoming_m.
html (“The Federal Bureau of Investigation reported that corporate fraud more than 
doubled from 279 cases in 2003 to 529 in 2007 . . . . The financial frauds include various 
forms of theft, such as Ponzi Schemes and embezzlement.”). 
 154 See, e.g., THE FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY 
REPORT XV-XX (2011), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-FCIC/pdf/GPO-
FCIC.pdf. 
 155 The focus here is on clawback actions that arise independent of the 
clawback target’s participation in the underlying wrong. Since 1971, the SEC has 
enjoyed power to seek restitution from corporate executives or corporations that have 
engaged in financial fraud, with the inaugural case involving insider trading. Sec. & 
Exch. Comm’n v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 1301, 1307-08 (2d Cir. 1971). Yet, 
until the 1990s, the rationale for these SEC clawback suits was to deter wrongdoing, 
and not to distribute the returned money to those whom the insider trading had 
injured. See Zimmerman, supra note 2, at 527-28; Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Fischbach 
Corp., 133 F.3d 170, 175 (2d Cir. 1997) (“Although disgorged funds may often go to 
compensate securities fraud victims for their losses, such compensation is a distinctly 
secondary goal.”). Compensation became a primary goal of SEC disgorgement actions 
“in 1990, when Congress passed the Securities Enforcement Remedies and Penny Stock 
Reform Act. The Penny Stock Reform Act . . . expressly authorized the SEC to design 
rules for the distribution of such awards.” Zimmerman, supra note 1, at 528 (citations 
omitted). Further, Section 308 of Sarbanes-Oxley, the “Fair Funds” provision, grants 
the SEC authority to seek “any equitable relief that may be appropriate or necessary 
for the benefit of investors.” Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 
§§ 305(b), 308, 116 Stat. 745, 779 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(5) (2006)). As Aaron 
Zimmerman describes,  
In the six complete fiscal years since Congress passed the Fair Funds Act, the 
SEC has brought between 218 and 335 judicial enforcement actions per year. In 
the 2009 calendar year alone, the SEC distributed over $2.1 billion to 
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three federal statutes that permit executive compensation 
clawbacks developed in response to cases of dramatic financial 
wrongdoing. In particular, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 
(SOX)156 was passed in the wake of the Enron and Worldcom 
scandals,157 the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 (Dodd-Frank)158 was 
passed in the wake of the subprime mortgage crisis and 
ensuing financial meltdown in 2007 and 2008,159 and the 
Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 (EESA)160 was 
passed in conjunction with the bailout program that the 
financial meltdown necessitated.161 Under each statute, the 
triggering event is a finding that the corporation in question 
issued a materially inaccurate earnings statement.162 A further 
triggering event occurs under Dodd-Frank upon a finding that 
the corporation otherwise materially failed to comply with a 
federal securities reporting regulation.163  
The scope of each clawback provision varies: SOX 
restricts its clawback provisions to the corporation’s CEO and 
CFO.164 EESA permits clawing back compensation from the 
CEO and the next twenty highest paid executives.165 And Dodd-
Frank, the most expansive of the three, subjects any executive 
of the corporation to a clawback action.166 On the other hand, 
Dodd-Frank contemplates a less severe clawback than does 
either SOX or EESA. Dodd-Frank restricts the clawback 
amount to that in excess of what the executive would have 
  
investors–more than twice as much as the amount the SEC collected between 
1984 and 1992. 
See Zimmerman, supra note 1, at 529-30 (citations omitted). 
 156 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. Nos. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745. 
 157 See Larry E. Ribstein, Market vs. Regulatory Responses to Corporate 
Fraud: A Critique of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 28 J. CORP. L. 1, 3 (2003).  
 158 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 
111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010). 
 159 See William E. Cohen, Foreword to DAVID SKEEL, THE NEW FINANCIAL DEAL: 
UNDERSTANDING THE DODD-FRANK ACT AND ITS (UNINTENDED) CONSEQUENCES ix (2010). 
 160 Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, div. A, Pub. L. No. 110-343, 
122 Stat. 3765. 
 161 See, e.g., Sandra Seitman, Note, Uncle Sam’s New Piggy Bank: Confronting 
Crisis Through TARP and Federal Oversight, BUS. L. BRIEF 53, 53 (Fall/Winter 2009-2010). 
 162 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, § 304(a); Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act, § 954; Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, § 11(b)(3)(B).  
 163 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, § 954. 
 164 See, e.g., Joseph E. Bachelder III, Clawbacks Under Dodd-Frank and Other 
Federal Statutes, HARVARD LAW SCH. FORUM ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. 
REGULATION (June 9, 2011, 9:14 AM), http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2011/06/09/ 
clawbacks-under-dodd-frank-and-other-federal-statutes/. 
 165 See id. 
 166 See id. 
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earned under the correct earnings statement,167 while both SOX 
and EESA permit recovery of all of the incentive-based 
compensation belonging to the targeted executive.168 The reach-
back period under Dodd-Frank is the three years preceding the 
reporting error or failure, while it is twelve months under SOX 
and there is no specified reach-back period under EESA.169 
Importantly, these statutes permit clawbacks 
independently of whether the targeted individual bears a 
culpable connection to the triggering event.170 Each inflicts its 
clawback measures on both “innocent” and culpable executives 
alike.171 One might then think that these statutes, similar to the 
Ponzi scheme clawback actions, stand for the proposition that an 
individual ought not profit from another’s wrongdoing, whether 
or not that individual is culpable of the wrongdoing. Nonetheless, 
there are significant differences between the executive clawback 
statutes and the Ponzi scheme clawback cases.  
As compared with the Ponzi scheme clawbacks, 
executive clawbacks are at once more compelling and less 
harsh. Even in cases where the executive did not participate in 
the false or fraudulent financial accounting, one could argue 
  
 167 See id. A separate provision of Dodd-Frank applies to failed financial 
companies and targets “any current or former senior executive or director substantially 
responsible for the failed condition of the covered financial company” for a clawback of 
“any compensation received during the 2-year period preceding the date on which the 
Corporation was appointed as the receiver of the covered financial company, except 
that, in the case of fraud, no time limit shall apply.” Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform 
and Consumer Protection Act, H.R. 4173, 111th Cong. § 210(S) (2010). Since this 
provision contemplates only those officers or directors who bear a culpable connection 
to the company’s failure, I do not consider it further. 
 168 For the relevant provision, see Jesse Fried & Nitzan Shilon, Excess-Pay 
Clawbacks, 36 J. CORP. L. 721, 730 (2011). 
 169 See generally Bachelder, supra note 164. 
 170 See, e.g., Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Jenkins, No. 09-CV-0510-PHX-RJB, slip 
op. (D. Ariz. Nov. 16, 2011), available at http://www.wlrk.com/docs/SECVJenkins09-cv-
1510-136.pdf (holding that the SEC may claw back executive compensation even when 
the executive in question was not guilty of the misconduct that necessitated the 
restatement); Ropes & Gray, Court Says Sarbanes-Oxley Allows “Clawbacks” of 
Executive’s Bonuses, ALERTS & LEGAL UPDATES, http://www.ropesgray.com/files/ 
Publication/09095ca9-bef7-49e2-aa9d-45eab883df2f/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/ 
6fc9ecd8-5f53-45bc-89dc-48b37b701ba7/06142010TaxBenefitsAlert.pdf (last visited 
Mar. 12, 2012); Liz Skola, The Dodd-Frank Act Requires Publicly-Traded Companies to 
Adopt Compensation Clawback Policies, SECURITIES LITIGATION BLOG (Aug. 5, 2010, 
9:05 AM), http://securities.litigation.alston.com/blog.aspx?entry=3869 (“The recent no-
fault interpretation of the Sarbanes-Oxley clawback is codified in the Dodd-Frank Act 
clawback statute.”); Bachelder, supra note 164 (“EESA § 111(b)(3)(B) contains no 
provision limiting it to cases of misconduct.”). 
 171 For the view that an executive might not be innocent of a corporate wrong 
even if she neither participated in, knew about, or was obligated to know about, the 
wrong, see Amy J. Sepinwall, Guilty by Proxy: Expanding the Boundaries of 
Responsibility in the Face of Corporate Crime, 63 HASTINGS L.J. 411, 435-45 (2012).  
46 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 78:1 
that restitution of the excess compensation–i.e., the incentive-
based pay that used the falsely inflated figures as the basis for 
calculating the executive’s bonuses, etc.–is nonetheless 
warranted. Under Dodd-Frank, for example, the executive 
clawback only rectifies an over-payment and returns the 
executive to the position she would have occupied had the 
corporation’s accounting been accurate from the start.172 Thus, 
she retains whatever financial rewards are owed to her by 
virtue of what the company did in fact earn–unlike the 
winning Ponzi scheme investor, who is forced to return all of 
her profits.  
Further, even the more severe clawbacks that SOX and 
EESA permit–where the executive may be compelled to return 
all of her incentive-based pay–appear more justifiable than do 
the Ponzi scheme clawbacks. For one thing, the executive faces 
a shorter reach-back period than does the Ponzi scheme 
investor.173 Moreover, the executive may not feel the sting of 
any clawback she faces, since corporations are permitted to 
insure their officers and directors against clawbacks at the 
shareholders’ expense, such that the insurance policy would 
cover the executive’s obligations to return money pursuant to a 
successful clawback action.174 By contrast, Ponzi scheme 
investors cannot insure their investments against fraud.  
  
 172 Usha Rodrigues puts the point nicely: “If you get a bonus because you meet 
a goal, and it later turns out that the goal wasn’t really met because someone messed 
with the numbers, then you need to give the money back. Even if you didn’t do anything 
wrong, you didn’t really earn that money.” Usha Rodrigues, Clawbacks, Outrage, and 
Interpretation, CONGLOMERATE (Aug. 10, 2009), http://www.theconglomerate.org/2009/ 
08/clawbacks-outrage-and-interpretation.html (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 173 More specifically, the reach back period is no more than three years under 
any of the federal statutes for the executive, while state law permits avoidance of a 
fraudulent transfer up to six years prior to the scheme’s collapse. See supra notes 168-
169 and accompanying text. State law follows one of two forms–the Uniform 
Fraudulent Conveyances Act (UFCA) or Uniform Fraudulent Transfers Act (UFTA). 
There is no uniform reach-back period among UFCA states, though the range is 
between two and six years; the UFTA provides a four-year reach-back period. See 
White, supra note 88, at 358-59. 
 174 Reynolds Holding & Una Galani, Pushing Back on Clawbacks, N.Y. TIMES, 
Dec. 19, 2011, at B2, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/20/business/ 
pushing-back-on-clawbacks.html. For example, the FDIC sued three executives at 
Washington Mutual, the failed bank, seeking to recover $900 million from them on the 
allegation that they took excessive risks in order to reap short-term profits. See, e.g., 
Louise Story, Ex-Bank Executives Settle F.D.I.C. Lawsuit, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13, 2011, at 
B5, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/14/business/ex-bank-executives-
settle-fdic-suit.html. The executives ended up settling for $64 million, but they paid 
only $400,000 of that out of pocket; the remainder was covered by their clawback 
insurance. See id. Corporations and insurance companies seek to justify the insurance 
coverage by arguing that the clawback provisions are intended for restitutionary, and 
not punitive, purposes, and so it doesn’t matter whether the returned money comes 
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In any event, even while financial regulators are 
permitted to pursue executive clawbacks, this is a remedy that 
commentators revile175 and that even the SEC regulators seem 
to shun.176 Although companies issued 4609 earnings 
restatements between 2006 and 2009, the SEC exercised its 
Sarbanes-Oxley authority to seek executive clawbacks in only 
eleven instances.177 While Dodd-Frank’s clawback provisions 
were meant to increase the number of such actions by allowing 
  
from the executive’s pocket or instead that of the insurance company. See id. Their 
position would seem to overlook the deterrent aspect of clawbacks, which can succeed 
only if the executive personally suffers a pecuniary consequence as a result of her 
company’s mistaken statements. 
 175 See, e.g., Larry Ribstein, Punishing Innocent Executives: SOX’s Litigation 
Time Bomb Goes Off, IDEOBLOG (July 22, 2009 11:53 AM), http://busmovie.typepad.com/ 
ideoblog/2009/07/punishing-innocent-executives-soxs-litigation-time-bomb-goes-
off.html; Russell G. Ryan, The SEC vs. CEO Pay, WALL ST. J., (Aug. 4, 2009), available at 
http://www.chline.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204619004574324511579902986.html. 
 176 Cf. Manning G. Warren III, Equitable Clawback: An Essay on Restoration 
of Executive Compensation, 12 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 1135 (bemoaning the under-utilization 
of a common law doctrine that would allow private individuals seeking forfeiture of 
compensation as a remedy to sue executives who had breached their fiduciary duties).  
 177 See, e.g., Fried & Shilon, supra note 168, at 731. The SEC took action 
against transgressing corporations in a number of notable cases of corporate 
wrongdoing. In these cases, the SEC filed complaints against executives implicated in 
the wrongdoing but declined to pursue clawbacks. See, e.g., Complaint at 1-2, Sec. & 
Exch. Comm’n v. Dell Inc., No. 1:10-cv-01245 (D. D.C. July 22, 2010), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2010/comp21599.pdf (SEC’s action against 
Dell Computers, its CEO, and its CFO for overstating earnings between 2002 and 
2006); see also Taking Away Dell’s Cookie Jar, ECONOMIST ONLINE (July 23, 2010, 5:58 
PM) http://www.economist.com/blogs/newsbook/2010/07/dells_sec_settlement. Dell 
agreed to pay a penalty of $100 million to settle SEC charges that it “manipulated its 
accounting over an extended period to project financial results that the company 
wished it had achieved.” Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Charges Dell 
and Senior Executives with Disclosure and Accounting Fraud (July 22, 2010), available 
at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2010/2010-131.htm (citation omitted) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). The CEO and CFO each “agreed to pay a $4 million penalty 
to settle the case without admitting or denying wrongdoing, but didn’t return any pay,” 
which implies that this was not a true “clawback.” Kara Scannell, Clawbacks Divide 
SEC, WALL ST. J., Aug. 7, 2010, at B3, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/ 
SB10001424052748703988304575413671786664134.html. 
  Similarly, in a case brought by the SEC against Hank Greenberg, former 
CEO of AIG, the SEC alleged that under Greenberg’s leadership AIG “faced a number 
of financial challenges that, had they been properly reported or accounted for, would 
have exposed significant missteps in AIG’s operations and caused the company to miss 
certain key earnings and growth targets.” Complaint at 46, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. 
Greenberg, No. 09 Civ. 6939 (S.D.N.Y. 2009), available at http://online.wsj.com/public/ 
resources/documents/SECcomplaintgreenberg806.pdf. The SEC complaint sought 
disgorgement of ill-gotten gains and civil penalties pursuant to Section 21(d)(3) of the 
Exchange Act (15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(3) (2010)) but, of particular relevance here, did not seek to 
clawback any incentive-based compensation, even though the SEC had the authority to do 
so under Section 304 of Sarbanes-Oxley. Id. at 46; see also Stephen Bainbridge, “Unlike 
French wine, fraud cases don’t get better with age,” PROFESSORBAINBRIDGE.COM (Aug. 11, 
2009, 12:19 PM), http://www.professorbainbridge.com/professorbainbridgecom/2009/08/ 
unlike-french-wine-fraud-cases-dont-get-better-with-age.html.  
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both shareholders and the SEC to litigate them, this aspect of 
Dodd-Frank has met substantial criticism178 and has not been 
invoked even in cases involving the financial institutions whose 
failures brought the global markets to the brink of collapse.179  
Finally, even if executive clawback actions were to 
become commonplace, they would still be a far cry from 
investor clawback actions, the tool of choice in the recovery 
efforts of the Madoff trustee.180 The difference arises, at least in 
part, because unlike the innocent Ponzi scheme investor, the 
executive cannot plausibly contend that she reasonably relied 
on the veracity of the earnings statement and, in turn, the 
legitimacy of her bonus payment for the year in question. The 
  
 178 See, e.g., Donald Delves, Clawback Requirement Removes Board Discretion, 
FORBES (July 14, 2009, 10:09 AM), available at http://www.forbes.com/sites/donalddelves/ 
2011/07/14/clawback-requirement-removes-board-discretion/. Delves argues that 
clawbacks are ill-advised because they may make accounting departments less likely to 
uncover errors as employees within these departments will fear retaliation from the 
CEO who is forced to return incentive-based pay. Id. Alternatively, Delves argues that 
clawbacks may just encourage boards to structure executive pay in a way that does not 
key it to the company’s performance. Id. Such board action would run counter to Dodd-
Frank’s goal of aligning the interests of the executive and her corporation. Greg 
Michaels, G20 Leaders Have The Right Idea, DEALBREAKER (Sept. 16, 2009, 10:17 AM), 
http://dealbreaker.com/2009/09/g20-leaders-have-the-right-idea/ (offering the tongue-in-
cheek suggestion that politicians zealous about clawbacks should consider passing 
legislation that would allow for recoupment of a politician’s salary in the event that her 
successor inherits problems for which she bears responsibility).  
 179 Thus,  
James E. Cayne, the former chief executive of Bear Stearns, still lives in his 
$28.24 million apartment at the Plaza Hotel; Joseph J. Cassano the former chief 
executive of A.I.G. Financial Products, kept more than $100 million in 
compensation; and E. Stanley O’Neal, who was the chief executive of Merrill 
Lynch, retired with a pay package valued at more [than] $300 million. 
Steven M. Davidoff, In F.D.I.C.’s Proposal, Incentive for Excessive Risk Remains, N.Y. 
TIMES (DEALBOOK) (Apr. 12, 2011, 6:00 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/04/12/ 
in-f-d-i-c-s-proposal-incentive-for-excessive-risk-remains/. 
 180 The law does prohibit a corporation from issuing dividends if it is 
insolvent, or if the distribution would make it so. See Clark, supra note 94, at 554-60. 
So, shareholders are prospectively barred from receiving funds that would hinder 
repayment of the corporation’s creditors. But a prospective bar on receiving a profit to 
which one is not affirmatively entitled is a far cry from a claim that one must return a 
received profit to which one legitimately believed oneself entitled. In any event, there are a 
number of ways in which the corporation can circumvent the bar, as Clark details. Id. at 
556-58. Shareholders might well receive profits that would diminish the assets available 
for distribution to the corporation’s creditors. Further, the circumstances under which 
these profits would be subject to clawback are far more constrained than the general 
clawback provisions. See id. at 558-59 n.154 (There are “provisions in corporate laws 
specifically stating the conditions under which stockholders may be liable to corporate 
creditors for improper dividends received . . . . Some of these provisions are clearly more 
lenient than those applicable to the ordinary fraudulent transferee or grantor, e.g., 
provisions immunizing from any duty to disgorge dividends those stockholders who were 
ignorant of the impropriety of the dividends, even when the dividends were paid while the 
corporation was insolvent.” (citation omitted)). 
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executive is not a disinterested party without access to the 
relevant financial records, who simply takes the statements 
and the money that they engender at face value.181 This is not to 
suggest that there is an implicit kind of culpability that the 
executive bears–i.e., negligence or a failure of due diligence–
which justifies the clawback. The executive may be genuinely 
and permissibly ignorant of the financial errors. Still, it is her 
corporation, and if its earnings statements contain errors, she 
should be denied the benefits of the mistake.182 
Instead, a more promising parallel to the Ponzi scheme 
clawback case is the circumstance in which an innocent 
shareholder suffers pecuniary consequences as a result of a 
wrong committed by the corporation.  
B. Shareholder-Funded Restitution 
Two general kinds of cases occur where shareholders 
appear to suffer pecuniary consequences as a result of 
corporate conduct of which they are innocent. The first is the 
garden-variety case where the corporation faces a fine or 
damages award and paying it will lower share value. Though 
the shareholder thereby incurs a potential loss, this is not a 
true clawback because the shareholder is not being asked to 
return money that she had already received. Nonetheless, it is 
worth examining this case because one might think it 
represents a strand of doctrine where innocent investors suffer 
in order to defray the losses of the victims of another’s wrong–
in this case, the corporation’s. Accordingly, it is possible that 
this example could provide support for clawbacks targeting 
innocent Ponzi scheme investors. The second kind of case 
involves straightforward shareholder clawbacks and arises 
  
 181 One way to put the difference between the executive’s relationship to her 
company’s financial performance and the winning Ponzi scheme investor’s relationship 
to the actual finances of the scheme would be to note that the latter is an “arm’s length 
bargain,” while the former is not. See, e.g., Merrill v. Abbott (In re Universal Clearing 
House), 77 B.R. 843, 862 (D. Utah 1987) (stating that the test for good faith “is whether 
the transaction in question bears the earmarks of an arm’s length bargain”) (citation 
omitted). Madoff himself insisted that his investors lacked both the financial 
wherewithal and the means to have uncovered the fraud: “Although I explained the 
Strategy to them they were not sophisticated enough to evaluate it properly . . . . They 
were not in a position to perform the necessary due diligence and did not have access to 
necessary financial info or records.” See Toobin, supra note 8, at 15 (internal quotation 
marks omitted); see also id. at 19. 
 182 Cf. Sepinwall, supra note 171, at 434 (providing an account that would 
hold executives responsible for corporate wrongs independent of whether the executives 
satisfy the traditional hallmarks of individual culpability).  
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when an insolvent corporation has undergone a leveraged 
buyout. Here, the creditors can seek to reclaim money that the 
corporation’s former shareholders received in selling their 
shares to the corporation’s management-cum-owners in the 
leveraged buy-out (LBO) process.  
1. Consequences to Shareholders of Corporate Wrongdoing 
When a corporation finds itself faced with a financial 
penalty or significant damages judgment, shareholders might 
see the value of their shares drop.183 This might seem unfair in 
light of the traditional separation between ownership and 
control, which entails that shareholders have no say over the 
corporation’s day-to-day activities184 and therefore no available 
means to prevent the wrongful conduct that precipitates a 
penalty or judgment. Moreover, the unfairness would be even 
more apparent in cases where those who hold shares at the 
time of redress purchased their shares after the wrongdoing 
had occurred but at a price that did not reflect the possibility 
that the corporation might face the specific penalty or 
judgment in question–for example, because the corporate 
wrong had not been disclosed or even discovered at the time 
the investor purchased her shares.  
To make matters more concrete, consider fraud-on-the-
market cases, where the corporation misstates its financial 
situation and paints a rosier picture than is warranted. In light 
of the fraudulent statement, share prices rise. To take 
advantage of the rise in share price, some investors holding 
shares in the corporation choose to sell, and those who buy the 
shares then pay an artificially inflated price. When the fraud 
comes to light, those who bought the shares at an inflated price 
will sue the corporation for damages, rather than the ex-
shareholders who profited from the corporation’s fraud. If the 
buying shareholders prevail in their suit, it is the corporation’s 
current shareholders–who might well include the plaintiffs in 
  
 183 See, e.g., V.S. Khanna, Corporate Criminal Liability: What Purpose Does It 
Serve?, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1477, 1495 (1996) (“Imposing sanctions on a corporation for 
the acts of its managers or employees presumably decreases the corporation’s net 
worth. Shareholders [. . .] bear the brunt of such a decrease . . . .”) (citation omitted). Cf. 
Daniel R. Fischel & Alan O. Sykes, Corporate Crime, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 319, 349 (1996) 
(addressing criminal fines, and arguing that “in the case of a corporation, the burden of 
a punitive award will fall primarily on the shareholders, most of whom usually have no 
connection to the wrongdoing in question.”). 
 184 The classic text articulating this conception of the corporation is ADOLF 
BERLE & GARDINER MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932). 
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the suit!–who will suffer, at least if the corporation’s share 
price drops as a result.185  
One might then be inclined to say that the SEC’s actions 
here require innocent parties to contribute to defraying the 
losses of the victims of a wrong, in much the same way that 
innocent Ponzi scheme “winners” are made to contribute to 
defraying the losses of the “losers” of the Ponzi scheme. But 
there are important distinctions. For one thing, it’s not clear 
that those who own shares at the time the corporation is 
subject to the penalty or judgment do in fact sustain a loss. The 
company’s share price might take a dip, but unless the 
shareholder is compelled to sell in the immediate aftermath of 
the penalty’s imposition, this may represent only a paper loss. 
Second, shareholders enjoy limited liability; the most any 
shareholder can lose is the amount of her investment. By 
contrast, a Ponzi scheme winner who no longer has the money 
subject to the clawback can, in principle, have her wages 
garnished or assets seized in order to satisfy the trustee’s 
claims against her. Third, if the company is forced to disgorge 
only the funds corresponding to the total amount by which the 
share value was artificially inflated, and without incurring an 
additional financial penalty, then the current shareholders 
come to occupy a position no worse than the one they would 
have occupied had the fraud never occurred. Finally, it is not 
the loss in share value that compensates the corporation’s 
victims. The money shareholders lose is not the same money 
that helps to make the victims whole. Indeed, the drop in share 
price may correspond only very loosely to the fine or damages 
award that has been imposed on the corporation.186 For all of 
these reasons, cases where innocent shareholders sustain a loss 
in share value as a result of the corporation’s restitutionary or 
compensatory obligations are vastly different from those faced 
by innocent investors in the Madoff clawback actions, who may 
be compelled to return money that they legitimately thought 
was theirs in order to compensate the Madoff losers. As such, 
innocent shareholders in these cases do not face the unfairness 
that the innocent targets of a Ponzi scheme clawback suit face. 
In fact, it is not clear that the former face any unfairness at all. 
  
 185 See, e.g., William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, The Political Economy 
of Fraud on the Market, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 69, 73 (2011). 
 186 This would be the case if, for example, analysts project that the corporation 
stands to earn significant profits in the coming quarters and these projections offset 
the reduction in share price caused by the penalty.  
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2. Shareholder Clawbacks in the Wake of a Leveraged 
Buyout 
There is, however, one type of case where a shareholder 
can be required to return money she made in the market–
namely, where she has sold her shares as part of an LBO and 
the target corporation goes bankrupt shortly thereafter. In a 
typical LBO, management privatizes a publicly traded 
corporation by buying back all of the outstanding shares and 
delisting the corporation. In order to purchase the outstanding 
shares, management often borrows money from a third-party–
e.g., a bank–and secures its loan with the target corporation’s 
assets, thereby increasing the target corporation’s liabilities to the 
potential detriment of the corporation’s existing creditors.187 As 
one commentator explains, the corporation’s “new debt is likely to 
be senior secured debt. Thus, by definition, LBOs adversely affect 
existing creditors of the company by reducing the assets available 
for the satisfaction of obligations owed to them.”188  
In the event that the acquired corporation becomes 
insolvent shortly after the buyout, the question arises as to 
whether the share purchases constituted fraudulent transfers, 
such that a bankruptcy trustee would be permitted to seek to 
claw back the money that the former shareholders received 
when they sold their shares to management.189 Some 
commentators and courts have argued that the fraudulent 
transfer provisions should not extend to the LBO context.190 
Nonetheless, the vast majority of courts have approved the use 
of clawback suits against former shareholders in this context.191 
Requiring former shareholders to return money in the 
wake of the insolvency of a corporation in which they no longer 
  
 187 See, e.g., Robert J. White, Leveraged Buyouts and Fraudulent Conveyance 
Laws Under the Bankruptcy Code–Like Oil and Water, They Just Don’t Mix, 1991 ANN. 
SURV. AM. L. 357, 359, 362 & n.29 (1992); Borowitz & Hahn, supra note 114, at 67, 70-71. 
 188 Kathryn V. Smyser, Going Private and Going Under, 63 IND. L.J. 781, 786 
(1987-1988). 
 189 In addition to pursuing clawbacks against the former shareholders, the 
bankruptcy trustee could also target the lending bank, which has been “arguably 
enriched at [the] creditors’ expense,” Franci J. Blassberg & John M. Vasily, The 
Lender’s Perspective on Leveraged Acquisitions, 676 PLI/Corp 69, 127 (1990).  
 190 See, e.g., Kupetz v. Wolf, 845 F.2d 842, 848 (9th Cir. 1988); Baird & 
Jackson, supra note 96, at 834.  
 191 See generally Borowitz & Hahn, supra note 114, at 78 (noting that “the 
applicability of fraudulent conveyance law, as currently enacted, to leveraged buyouts 
is clear, and the vast majority of courts to have considered the issue have so held” and 
collecting representative cases). For a scholarly defense of this doctrinal development 
that seeks to counter Baird and Jackson’s arguments (see supra note 94), see generally 
Smyser, supra note 188. 
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hold shares might seem like the height of unfairness–both 
because the shareholders had presumably given “fair value” in 
the form of their ownership shares and because the shareholders 
appear to be innocent of the conduct leading to the acquired 
corporation’s bankruptcy. As such, we might think that there 
are relevant similarities between this set of clawbacks and the 
clawbacks innocent investors in a Ponzi scheme face. A closer 
look, however, reveals important differences. 
First, there need be no relationship between the price at 
which the shareholders sell their shares and the fair market 
value of the shares. In a barely solvent corporation, for 
example, the price management is willing to pay may be keyed 
to the amount of the loan it can secure, rather than the value of 
the equity interest in the company. The bank might determine 
the loan amount without regard to the corporation’s already 
existing debt. After all, the bank will enjoy priority over existing 
creditors; as long as the target corporation can secure the bank’s 
loan, the bank has no reason to concern itself with the 
corporation’s existing obligations.192 Thus, in a world without 
shareholder clawbacks, an LBO would be attractive to a “buyer, 
seller and third party lender precisely because it [would] allow[] 
all parties to the buyout to shift some portion of the risk of loss 
associated with their investment in the company to the 
‘investors’ in the company who are not involved in the buyout–
the other creditors.”193 This is especially true in the case where 
the target corporation is already financially troubled, since the 
shareholders couldn’t readily sell their shares on the secondary 
market. An LBO thereby provides them with a way both to 
obtain more money for their shares than they otherwise could, 
and to “withdraw[] their capital from exposure to total loss in 
the event the company [were to go] bankrupt.”194 Moreover, 
unlike the case in which the corporation incurs more debt to 
fund an entrepreneurial activity that might eventually be 
profitable, “a leveraged buyout involves a transaction in which 
the corporate debtor pledges valuable assets ‘without getting 
anything in return’ because the loan proceeds are used to pay 
the selling shareholders.”195 
Further, the existing shareholders are not without the 
power to promote, or even mandate, the LBO. In the process, 
  
 192 See Smyser, supra note 188, at 798. 
 193 Id. at 799. 
 194 Id. at 798. 
 195 Id. at 803. 
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the existing shareholders effectively jump the queue that would 
exist in the event of a bankruptcy, given that the shareholders’ 
equity interest in the company is subordinate to the claims of 
the company’s creditors. Had the public corporation gone 
bankrupt, the shareholders would have been able to claim only 
the value remaining after creditors had been paid; by forcing 
the corporation to buy back the shareholders’ stock before the 
company declares bankruptcy, the shareholders enjoy a priority 
over the company’s creditors that they are not entitled to. 
The role shareholders play in an LBO, then, is not like 
the role innocent winners play in a Ponzi scheme. Instead, the 
shareholders’ role more closely resembles the role played by a 
group of Ponzi scheme investors who, knowing of the fraud and 
seeing the scheme approach the brink of collapse, encourage its 
operator to find new investors or seek to recruit new investors 
themselves.196 These investors participate in the scheme in a 
way that makes them complicit in it;197 they hardly count as 
innocent winners.198 It does not seem at all unfair to require 
such accomplices to return any money they have withdrawn. 
Doing so is consistent with the classic dictate that an 
individual may not profit from her own wrongdoing199 but 
instead must redress her victims.200 In a similar vein, it is not 
untoward to ask the former shareholders of an LBO to return 
the money they received from selling their shares where they 
encouraged, or perhaps even directed, the sale. Again, all of 
this suggests that the typical shareholders in an LBO are 
  
 196 This is the role that Sonja Kohn, an Austrian banker, is alleged to have 
played in the Madoff Ponzi scheme. See, e.g., Diana B. Henriques & Peter Lattman, 
Madoff Trustee Seeks $19.6 Billion From Austrian Banker, N.Y. TIMES (DEALBOOK) 
(Dec. 10, 2010, 12:22 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2010/12/10/madoff-trustee-
seeks-19-6-billion-from-austrian-banker (“[A]ccording to the complaint [Picard filed 
against Kohn], she knowingly raised billions of dollars in cash to sustain Mr. Madoff’s 
fraud in exchange for at least $62 million in secret kickbacks . . . .”).  
 197 See, e.g., Model Penal Code § 2.06(3) (1985) (stating that a person is 
criminally liable as an accomplice if “(a) with the purpose of promoting or facilitating 
the commission of the offense, he, (i) solicits [the] other person to commit it, or (ii) aids 
or agrees or attempts to aid such other person in planning or committing it, or (iii) 
having a legal duty to prevent the commission of the offense, fails to make proper effort 
[to prevent it]”).  
 198 But cf. In re Sharp Int’l Corp., 403 F.3d 43 (2d Cir. 2005) (finding no lack of 
good faith where bank knew that Ponzi scheme operator was recruiting new investors 
to raise funds to repay bank, because bank did not encourage the conduct and bank 
had no duty to notify the recruited investors that they were going to be duped). 
 199 See, e.g., Riggs v. Palmer, 115 N.Y. 506, 506 (1889) (denying grandson his 
inheritance because he killed his grandfather precisely in order to benefit from the 
provisions of the deceased’s will). For an extended discussion of the case, see RONALD 
DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 15-20, 130-31 (1986).  
 200 See 1 HILLIARD, supra note 1, at 83. 
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situated differently from the innocent investors in a Ponzi 
scheme.201 From the now well-established practice of clawing 
back money from the investors in the LBO context, then, we 
cannot infer anything about the justifiability of clawbacks 
against innocent Ponzi scheme winners. 
V. EXPANDING RESTITUTION 
In Part II, I argued that only a very strained reading of 
the fraudulent transfer provisions would support clawing back 
money from innocent Ponzi scheme investors, and in Parts III 
and IV, I sought to establish that no other doctrine permits 
reclaiming money from the innocent beneficiaries of a wrong, 
whose profits cannot be construed as a windfall and who 
reasonably relied on the authenticity of their earnings. 
Therefore, the clawback suits against innocent winners in a 
Ponzi scheme are anomalous. These winners incur restitutionary 
obligations that the law does not impose on other innocent 
beneficiaries of a wrong.  
At this point, one could seek to repudiate clawback suits 
altogether, arguing that if we are not prepared to have the 
innocent beneficiaries of wrongdoing restitute the wrongdoing’s 
victims across the board, we should not do so in the Ponzi 
scheme context alone. Instead, this Part adopts the opposite 
approach, arguing that we should recruit all innocent investors 
in our attempts to make the victims of financial fraud whole in 
  
 201 But what about the former shareholder who did nothing to encourage, let 
alone direct, the leveraged buyout, and who did not know and had no reason to know 
that the company would be over-leveraged if the LBO were to occur? Is she not in a 
position that is the moral equivalent of the innocent Ponzi scheme winner? It strikes 
me that even here there is firmer justification for a clawback against the shareholder 
than against the winner, for as a result of the LBO the shareholder succeeds in enjoying a 
higher priority than the company’s creditors, even while the creditors would have had a 
higher priority than the shareholder had both still had an interest in the company at the 
time of its bankruptcy. By contrast, the winner has a priority equal to that of the loser, and 
so at least cannot be accused of having jumped the queue, as it were. Nevertheless, even if 
the shareholder in question has played no role in encouraging the LBO, and even if we set 
aside the concern about her enjoying undue priority over the corporation’s creditors, it is 
not clear that a clawback action against her serves to undermine the objections to a 
clawback action against the innocent Ponzi scheme winner. Instead, we might well want to 
object to clawback actions against both. Cf. In re Estate of Wolf & Vine, Inc., 77 B.R. 754, 
760 (C.D. Cal. 1987) (objecting to a clawback suit in the wake of an LBO against innocent 
former shareholders, on the ground that the share purchase “was an entirely fair 
transaction from the seller’s perspective. In the Court’s view, it is an unwarranted 
extension of the fraudulent conveyance laws, or any laws, to attempt to deprive [the former 
shareholders] of the value they received in exchange for their business.”), aff’d sub nom. 
Kupetz v. Wolf, 845 F.2d 842 (9th Cir. 1988). Both cases, that is, might well involve an 
indefensible effort to recoup money in order to defray another’s losses.  
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Part V.A and beginning to develop a proposal for how this 
might be done in Part V.B.  
A. The Winners Reasonably Believed in the Authenticity of 
Their Winnings 
While the innocent Ponzi scheme winners are no less 
entitled to the “profits” they withdrew than are its losers, nor 
are they more entitled to them. However, the same can be said 
of any investor who profits from an arms-length investment. 
The innocent winners in a Ponzi scheme are no less entitled to 
their earnings than the winners in a legitimate investment 
scheme are entitled to the money they earn on their 
investment. That is the central insight motivating the 
arguments set forth here. 
Where some investors come out ahead and others come 
out behind, and luck is the only feature that separates the two, 
we might well want to counteract its effects. It is better to 
reclaim some money from the winners and transfer it to the 
losers, so that all share in the losses equitably. This is not to 
say that all cases in which fortune chooses the winner entail an 
obligation, or even a reason, for the winner to share her 
winnings among all of the game’s participants. For example, we 
would not think that the person holding a winning lottery 
ticket has any reason, let alone an obligation, to share the 
jackpot with all of the other lottery ticketholders.  
One clear way to draw a line between the lottery case 
and the Ponzi scheme case is to look to the participants’ 
reasonable expectations. The lottery ticket-holders know that 
only one of them will win, that the others will have supplied 
the money the winner wins, and that luck alone will determine 
the winner. The Ponzi scheme investors, on the other hand, 
reasonably conceive of themselves as sitting in the same boat: 
All who invest at the same time would win or lose together, and 
whether they were to win or lose would turn, they believe, on 
the scheme operator’s investment savvy, not the point in time 
at which they were to choose to withdraw their funds, which 
cannot be said to enhance or diminish the putative investors’ 
level of desert, given their presumed ignorance of the 
fraudulent nature of the scheme.202 At least in cases of financial 
  
 202 See supra notes 41-48 and accompanying text (presenting reasons to think 
the Madoff Ponzi scheme winners were blamelessly ignorant of his fraud). A real-life 
case bears out the claim that those Ponzi scheme winners who cashed out early are no 
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wrongdoing, where all investors are innocent yet some profit 
from the wrongdoing while others lose out, we might want to 
have those who have come out ahead to help defray the losses 
of those who would have otherwise come out behind.203 
Two questions present themselves at this point. First, 
why should we conceive of the scope of restitution as specific to 
a particular fraud, such that there is a special restitutionary 
relationship between the winners and losers of that fraud, 
rather than a general relationship that operates between 
winners and losers in the market as a whole? Second, why 
think that only those who benefit from a fraud may be made to 
offer restitution, rather than thinking that anyone who wins in 
the market–whether through a fraudulent or legitimate 
investment vehicle–ought to contribute? I address these 
questions in turn.  
Suppose that we were to decide that the “winners” in 
some financial frauds should have to give up their winnings 
and that the “losers” should receive compensation. Why require 
that restitution operate strictly between winners and losers of 
  
more or less deserving than those who had open accounts at the time of the scheme’s 
collapse and lost money they had invested or at least profits they thought they had 
earned: Steve Simkin and Laura Blank divorced in 2006, and split the $5.4 M in their 
Madoff account equally between them. Ms. Blank cashed out shortly thereafter, 
receiving 50% of the then-stated value of the money in their Madoff account. Mr. 
Simkin did not seek to withdraw most of his share of the money in the Madoff account 
and, when the scheme went bust, he lost the money he believed the account had held. 
He sought to sue Ms. Blank for a rescission of this part of their divorce agreement, 
arguing that, unbeknownst to them at the time, the Madoff account never existed, and 
so should not have been counted among the couple’s joint assets. Mr. Simkin lost at the 
trial level, but won on appeal. New York’s highest state court then reversed, on the 
ground that the Madoff account did exist–at least until December 2008, any time 
before which Mr. Simkin could have sought to cash out for the full amount he believed the 
account contained. See, e.g., Peter Lattman, Court Says Madoff Victim Can’t Redo Terms of 
His Divorce, N.Y. TIMES (DEALBOOK) (Apr. 3, 2012, 7:51 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/ 
2012/04/03/court-says-madoff-victim-cant-redo-terms-of-his-divorce/. 
  The Simkin-Blank dispute, then, presents us with a case in which a court 
effectively refuses to compel a particular winner to restitute a particular loser even 
though the court had no reason to think that the winner deserved her winnings any 
more than the loser deserved his losses.  
  Other cases in which one set of participants in a game or scheme fares far 
better than another solely as a matter of luck may be more complicated. (Consider, for 
example, the fortunes of the shareholders of a non-mining corporation at the time that 
it unexpectedly strikes gold relative to those of the prior shareholders who had cashed 
out before the gold strike.) I leave these more complicated cases to one side. 
 203 The notion that the winners and losers sit in the same boat appears to 
have escaped the notice of some members of both parties, as they proceed on an “every 
man for himself,” basis, to use the words of one Madoff investor, and engage in a 
“reality-show kind of fighting.” Eric Konigsberg, Investors in a Competition for a Piece of the 
Madoff Pie, N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 2009, at B1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/ 
29/29madoff.html (quoting one of the Madoff claimants) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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the same fraud? That is, why should the Madoff winners 
restitute the Madoff losers, rather than investors who were 
defrauded by Countrywide, for example? We now know that 
Countrywide overcharged customers who were desperately 
hanging onto their home loans–a federal offense for which it 
paid $108 million in fines204–and discriminated against Black 
and Hispanic borrowers, for which it paid an additional $335 
million fine.205 These fines presumably diminished the share 
value of those who held shares in Bank of America, which 
acquired Countrywide in 2008, at the time the fines were paid. 
Those who sold shares in Countrywide or Bank of America 
before the offenses were uncovered presumably received more 
money for their shares than they were worth, since 
Countrywide’s offenses inflated the share value at the time of 
sale.206 It might then be reasonable to think that the investors 
who innocently profited by selling Countrywide’s fraudulently 
inflated shares owe some or all of the profits they earned to 
those who bought the shares at an artificially inflated price, or 
to those whose shares diminished in value as a result of 
Countrywide’s fines. But again, why think that restitution 
should operate just between the Countrywide investors?  
To take an example that hits even closer to the Madoff 
scandal, consider that shareholders in “J.P. Morgan Chase 
[collectively] earned after-tax profits totaling $435 million 
between 1993 and 2008 as a result of the billions of dollars 
Madoff deposited in the bank using his investors’ money.”207 Yet 
no clawbacks are being pursued against these shareholders. 
Why shouldn’t the Madoff winners help defray the 
losses of the Countrywide losers, and why shouldn’t the 
Countrywide or J.P. Morgan Chase winners help make the 
  
 204 Fed. Trade Comm’n, Press Release: Countrywide Will Pay $108 Million for 
Overcharging Struggling Homeowners; Loan Servicer Inflated Fees, Mishandled Loans 
of Borrowers in Bankruptcy, June 7, 2010, available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2010/06/ 
countrywide.shtm. 
 205 See, e.g., Charlie Savage, Countrywide Will Settle a Bias Suit, N.Y. TIMES, 
Dec. 21, 2011, at B1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/22/business/us-
settlement-reported-on-countrywide-lending.html. 
 206 See, e.g., Ben Protess, Bank of America Profit Drops 37%, N.Y. TIMES 
(DEALBOOK) (Apr. 15, 2011, 7:27 AM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/04/15/bank-of-
america-profit-drops-nearly-36/?smid=pl-sare (“Bank of America reported a 37 percent 
drop in first-quarter earnings on Friday, as the nation’s biggest bank continued to 
battle the legacy of the mortgage crisis and legal problems linked to the ill-fated 
acquisition of Countrywide Financial.”). 
 207 Louis R. Davis & Linus Wilson, Estimating JP Morgan Chase’s Profits 
from the Madoff Deposits, 14 RISK MGMT. & INS. REV. 1, 107-19 (2011). 
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Madoff losers whole?208 The answer is surely related in part to 
administrative convenience; the trustee in the Madoff case does 
not have authority to claw back money from individuals who 
did not have accounts with Madoff. However, administrative 
convenience is relevant only if we have already determined 
that there is an obligation on the part of those who win in a 
fraudulent scheme of which they were ignorant to defray the 
losses of those who lose, whether from that same fraudulent 
scheme or from another. The innocent winners in a Ponzi 
scheme are not more responsible for the losers’ losses than is 
anyone else who is innocent of the fraud. So, we must turn to 
the second question–why think that those who innocently 
profit from a fraud bear obligations of restitution that those 
who profit from a legitimate investment lack? 
This question lacks a good answer. The innocent 
winners in a Ponzi scheme are innocent not just in the sense 
that they did not know–and had no reason to know–of the 
fraud, but also in the sense that, from their perspective, their 
withdrawals represented earnings as legitimate as the 
earnings they would have reaped from a genuine investment 
vehicle. It is on this ground that Judge Rakoff held that 
innocent investors in Madoff’s scheme may avail themselves of 
the Bankruptcy Code’s safe harbor provision,209 which 
“precludes the Trustee from bringing any action to recover from 
any of Madoff’s customers any of the monies paid by Madoff 
Securities to those customers except in the case of actual 
fraud.”210 Importantly, Judge Rakoff readily acknowledged that 
no securities were bought or sold, and that Madoff himself 
would not have been permitted to avail himself of the safe 
harbor provision.211 Nonetheless, “[f]rom the standpoint of 
Madoff Securities’ customers (except for any who were actual 
participants in the fraud), the settlement payments made to 
them by Madoff Securities were entirely bona fide, and they 
  
 208 Alan Strudler has intriguingly pursued questions of this kind in the 
context of large-scale accidents. Alan Strudler, Mass Torts and Moral Principles, 11 L. 
& PHIL. 297, 323-25 (1992). Strudler argues that even if one is merely causally 
responsible, and not morally responsible for accidental harm, one nonetheless bears an 
obligation to repair the harm that innocent bystanders lack. Whatever the merits of 
Strudler’s account for cases of mere causal responsibility, it is inapposite where, as 
here, one cannot even say that the innocent beneficiaries of the fraud caused the injury 
that the losers sustained. 
 209 Picard v. Katz, 462 B.R. 447, 451 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). The safe harbor 
provision is contained in 11 U.S.C. § 546(e) (2006). 
 210 Katz, 462 B.R. at 451-52. 
 211 See Picard v. Katz, 466 B.R. 208, 212 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). 
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therefore are fully entitled to invoke the protections of section 
546(e) [i.e., the safe harbor provision].”212 Judge Rakoff also 
implied elsewhere that what matters is the investors’ 
reasonable belief and, so long as that belief is reasonable, the 
court must treat the investors as if the belief were true,213 at 
least for purposes of the avoidance actions.214 
Judge Rakoff’s position supports the idea that the 
innocent investors reasonably relied on the authenticity of 
their withdrawals. Where a Madoff winner spent the money 
she withdrew–whether on grandchildren’s college tuition, 
living expenses, or even extravagant travel215–it might be 
unfair to pursue a clawback action against her, even if she is 
not so destitute as to be able to meet the trustee’s hardship 
standard.216 More to the point, since the latter set of investors 
has no more ground for relying on the legitimacy of their 
withdrawals than the winning Ponzi scheme investors have, it 
is unfair to treat Ponzi scheme winners differently from 
investors who withdraw money from a legitimate investment 
vehicle. As one commentator notes, “by what grace of God were 
many of us fortunate enough not to have relied on a 
  
 212 Katz, 462 B.R. at 452 n.3. 
 213 See, e.g., Picard v. Katz, 466 B.R. 208, 211 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (“[If] Madoff 
Securities was fairly viewed by the defendants and other customers as engaged in the 
business of effecting transactions in securities . . . [then] the Trustee . . . may well be 
barred from [pursuing avoidance actions except in cases of actual fraud due] to the 
application of § 546(e).” (emphasis added)).  
 214 Peter Henning has noted that Rakoff’s position conflicts with the Second 
Circuit’s net equity position, which declines to use as the basis of recovery the amounts 
investors believed they had in their Madoff accounts. See Henning, supra note 12. Still, 
Rakoff did not have before him the question of what investors were owed; he was 
addressing the different question of what they could, or could not, be made to return. It 
is possible that there is a principled basis upon which one could credit the investors’ 
reasonable beliefs for purposes of the clawback suits but not for purposes of 
determining their net equity. 
 215 See, e.g., Madoff’s Victims, MADOFFSCANDAL.COM: THE LARGEST FRAUD THAT 
THE WORLD HAS EVER SEEN, http://www.madoffscandal.com/madoffs-victims/ (last visited 
Mar. 12, 2012) (describing Ira Roth, whose withdrawals from his Madoff account were 
used to pay for his college tuition and his grandmother’s living expenses); U.S. Attorney’s 
Letter and Attached Victim Impact Statements (Mar. 13, 2009) United States v. Madoff, 
No. 09 Crim. 213 (DC) (S.D.N.Y. June 15, 2009), available at http://www.cbsnews.com/ 
htdocs/pdf/Madoff--Victim_Impact_Statements.pdf (quoting from Letter from Ted and 
Sue Rehage to Senators Baucus, Grassley, and United States Senate Finance Committee 
members, which stated: “As a result [of our Madoff losses], our traveling will be curtailed 
with no more 9 or 10 weeks with the grandkids which is disappointing for all of us. Now it 
will be a week or two in state at best.”).  
 216 For Picard’s list of the indicators he believes relevant to determining hardship, 
see Hardship Program, THE MADOFF RECOVERY INITIATIVE, http://www.madoff.com/ 
hardship-program-17.html (last visited Mar. 12, 2012). 
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Madoff . . . or somebody like [him]?”217 It may be no more than 
“dumb luck” that separates Ponzi scheme winners from those 
who win in a legitimate investment.218 And why should luck play 
such a decisive role in how one fares?219 In particular, why should 
we expect more from the innocent beneficiaries of a fraud than 
we expect from the innocent beneficiaries of a legitimate 
investment? The simple answer is that we should not. 
If this correct, one of two implications follows–either 
we should permit losses to remain where they fall, or we should 
enlist the Ponzi scheme winners along with all other 
investment winners to provide restitution. If the foregoing 
comments about luck have any intuitive appeal, they militate 
strongly in favor of the latter alternative. To allow losses to 
remain where they fall is to allow luck to govern how the 
winning and losing investors fare. But we can do better than 
that; we need not bow to luck’s whims. A form of restitution 
that gathers resources from all investment winners provides a 
more appropriate solution. 
B. Market-Wide Restitution 
A handful of commentators have championed the idea 
that winners and losers in a Ponzi scheme should together 
share in the losses the fraud has caused. Yet these 
commentators contemplate only intra-scheme restitution; they 
presume but do not defend the existence of a special connection 
binding the winners of a particular fraud to the losers of that 
fraud.220 By contrast, Part V.A demonstrated that all of those 
  
 217 Jeffrey M. Lipshaw, Disclosure and Judgment: “We Have Met Madoff and 
He Is Ours,” 35 U. DAYTON L. REV. 139, 139 n.1 (2009). 
 218 Id. at 139. 
 219 Indeed, many Madoff winners maintain that they were actually less greedy 
than were other winning investors in the market, having forsaken higher returns for 
Madoff’s steady but comparatively modest returns. So, if one did want to invoke the 
notion of desert, the Madoff winners would, at least on this basis, fare better than the 
investors in legitimate but aggressive and higher-performing schemes. See, e.g., Jon 
Healy, Are Bernard Madoff’s Victims Greedy?, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 19, 2011, 2:58 PM), 
http://opinion.latimes.com/opinionla/2011/08/are-bernard-madoffs-victims-greedy.html. 
Cf. Complaint at *2 ¶ 3, Haines v. Mass. Mut. Life Ins., 2009 WL 958069 (D. Mass. 
2009) (No. 1:09cv10182), available at http://clients.oakbridgeins.com/clients/blog/ 
haines.pdf (seeking class action relief against Madoff feeder funds and alleging that 
“[p]laintiffs and the other investors in these funds were not wild speculators rolling the 
dice for high returns, but rather safe-conservative investors looking to protect and grow 
their retirement funds.”). 
 220 See Cherry & Wong, supra note 15, at 408-10 (arguing for the desirability 
of ex ante clawbacks–i.e., provisions in the contract that a prospective investor signs 
that requires the investor to share in the losses should fraud emerge); Pozza et al., 
supra note 4, at 131 (“[A] fundamental principle should be that all victims share the 
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who innocently win in the market are similarly situated, 
whether their winnings arise from legitimate or fraudulent 
investment vehicles. All of them share responsibility for 
restituting fraud’s victims. Implementing this insight need not 
involve a novel crafting of policy. Instead, one or both of two 
currently debated tax initiatives would do the trick, by 
effectively raising the money needed to sustain a fraud 
compensation fund.  
The first is a variant on the financial transactions tax 
(FTT), also called a Tobin Tax.221 While the idea for such a tax 
emerged in the 1970s and was originally conceived as a 
restraint on currency speculation, there has been a renewed 
vigor in calls for adoption of a more encompassing FTT after 
the 2008 financial meltdown.222 In particular, as its supporters 
now envision it, the FTT would be assessed on most financial 
transactions and would affect most asset classes.223 The recent 
enthusiasm for an FTT stems from two policy goals that 
supporters believe it will serve. First, it will curb “socially 
useless” short-term equity transactions,224 and second, it will 
impose some of the costs of risky bank activity on the banks 
that contribute to systemic risk.225 But there is an additional 
benefit, especially relevant here. An FTT would raise money 
that could be used to compensate the victims of fraud. In 
particular, investment winners would contribute money to the 
compensation fund in proportion to the amount of their 
winnings, and the FTT rate could vary depending on whether 
the seller stood to reap a net gain from the transaction. A base 
tax would apply in all cases and its revenues could serve both 
policy goals described above. An additional tax could be levied 
against investment gains, with the money raised financing a 
  
pain on an equal basis. Simply because someone has cashed out before discovery or 
received proceeds for years, which are traceable to other Ponzi victim investments, 
should not allow them to have less pain than those who have received back little or 
nothing from the Ponzi schemer.”). 
 221 See, e.g., Edmund Conway, Joseph Stiglitz Calls for Tobin Tax on All Financial 
Trading Transactions, TELEGRAPH (Oct. 5, 2009), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/ 
financialcrisis/6262242/Joseph-Stiglitz-calls-for-Tobin-tax-on-all-financial-trading-
transactions.html; Carsten Volkery, Euro Zone Split over Financial Transaction Tax, DER 
SPIEGEL (Mar. 13, 2012), http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,820965,00.html.  
 222 See, e.g., Volkery, supra note 221. The G20 had debated, but failed to agree 
upon, an FTT at its September 2009 meeting. 
 223 Id. 
 224 See, e.g., Paul Krugman, Taxing the Speculators, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 27, 
2009, at A39. 
 225 Thus, a bill was introduced in the House entitled, “H.R. 4191: Let Wall 
Street Pay for the Restoration of Main Street Act of 2009.” H.R. 4191, 111th Cong. § 1 
(2009). 
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fraud victim compensation fund. In this way, the added tax 
would affirm the moral equivalence between the innocent 
winners and losers in financial transactions, as well as the 
moral equivalence between the innocent winners of a fraudulent 
scheme and the innocent winners of a legitimate one. 
A second option, which could be implemented in 
addition to, or instead of, the varying rate FTT, would be to 
answer the calls to raise the capital gains tax226 and to devote 
some of the revenue garnered from the tax increase to a fraud 
compensation fund. Here, too, the measure would recognize 
that, from the perspective of the innocent investor, it may be 
purely a matter of luck whether her investment dollars landed 
in a legitimate investment vehicle or a fraudulent one. 
The money set aside for fraud compensation–whether 
funded through an FTT, an increase in the capital gains tax, or 
both–would operate as a second tier of relief, after money 
garnered from the fraudster and her associates had been 
exhausted. Thus, trustees would still be needed in the wake of 
a fraud in order to identify those with a culpable connection to 
the fraud, to pursue clawbacks and punitive damages against 
them, and to ferret out claimants who knew or should have 
known about the fraud. Yet since either scheme would remove 
the need to seek clawbacks from innocent investors, the fund’s 
administration would be far more streamlined, and innocent 
winners would save a significant amount of money that they 
currently devote to defending themselves in clawback suits. 
While the foregoing proposal paints in broad strokes 
and many of the details remain to be worked out, it does 
suggest that ready solutions exist for ensuring that victims of 
fraud receive redress. More to the point, the proposed 
initiatives would appropriately distribute the burdens of 
restitution to all of those who profit from their investments. 
CONCLUSION 
Clawback suits against innocent beneficiaries of a fraud 
can be sustained neither by statute nor by other doctrines. 
Indeed, these suits are exceptional insofar as they demand that 
innocent individuals or entities return money they reasonably 
  
 226 See, e.g., Eliot Spitzer, The “Romney Rule”: Why Raising Capital Gains Taxes 
is Morally Right and Economically Wise, SLATE (Feb. 6, 2012, 12:32 PM), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/the_best_policy/2012/02/the_romney_rule
_raising_capital_gains_taxes_is_both_morally_right_and_good_for_the_economy_.html. 
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believed was theirs in order to redress another’s wrongdoing. 
Yet the innocent winners of a fraud are no more responsible for 
the losers’ losses than anyone else. Although we should not 
require that the victims of fraud bear their losses alone, we 
need not require that restitution derive solely from those who 
also had the misfortune of choosing the same, fraudulent 
investment vehicle. The market is a place where fraud may 
well be ineradicable.227 All those who subject their fates to its 
whims and who come out ahead as a result should share 
responsibility to redress the wreckage that fraud inflicts.  
  
 227 See, e.g., Elizabeth Warren, Reforming a Corrupt Club, WASH. POST, July 
20, 2012, at A19, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/elizabeth-
warren-libor-fraud-exposes-a-rotten-financial-system/2012/07/19/gJQAvDnDwW_ 
story.html; Felix Salmon, Why Finance Can’t Be Fixed with Better Regulation, 
REUTERS BLOG (July 23, 2012), available at 2012 WLNR 15675134. 
